Reuters: The rise & legacy of Vladimir Putin (PANEL VIDEO)

This is worth watching in full, with Gary Gasparov, Masha Gessen (somebody I've re-posted several times), David Remnick, and some Wall Street tool Roger Altman.




NEWSMAKER: The Rise & Legacy of Vladimir Putin
October 14, 2014 | Reuters

URL: http://www.reuters.com/video/2014/10/14/newsmaker-the-rise-legacy-of-vladimir-pu?videoId=346570215

RFE/RL: Most of Ukraine's ethnic Russians are loyal to Ukraine (PODCAST)

Here's a summary of this podcast:

• According to one poll, 87 percent of residents in heavily ethnic Russian regions Kharkiv and Odesa want to be part of Ukraine. Only 5 percent want to be part of Russia or "Novorossiya."

• 50 percent say their opinion of Russia has gotten worse.

• 56 percent now have negative views of Russia's president Vladimir Putin.

• Twice as many want Ukraine's future to be with Europe than with Russia.

• Meanwhile, 70 percent of Ukrainians say their native language is Ukrainian, even if they don't speak "fluent" Ukrainian.  61 percent say they speak Russian and Ukrainian "equally well."

• The two big exceptions are Crimea and Donbas, where residents still prefer vertikalnuiu vlast' (vertical power), where they feel more powerless and want to be part of a paternalistic (Soviet) state that takes care of them. It's both cultural and economic that they want a strong state to take care of them. Both Crimea and Donbas, significantly, are filled with forced emigres from Soviet Russia,  but many more in Donbas.

• Umland notes that Crimea is different because it has a majority of ethnic Russians, and between 40 and 60 percent indeed wanted to become part of Russia. (Minus Crimean Tatars). But Natalya Churikova notes that in 2013, before the Maidan revolution and Russian propaganda took hold, about 10 percent of Crimeans said they wanted to become part of Russia.\
• Indeed, the Russian citizen, FSB officer and pro-Russian military insurgent leader Igor Girkin once complained that he couldn't find enough local volunteers in Ukraine to fight for the insurgency against Ukraine. He needed Russian troops and materiel. 

• And as both Umland and Churikova posit, Ukrainians in "Russian" cities such as Odesa, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk refuse to be "reduced" to ethno-linguistic minorities or majorities; rather, (in addition to any patriotic feelings toward Ukraine), they look to what country or system offers them greater opportunities for political and self-expression. And Ukraine wins. They don't want to be part of "Putin's Russia" where "the state tells you what to do." 

• People in Crimea and Donbas, by contrast, argues Churikova, still think of Russia as Soviet Russia, and expect certain economic and social guarantees from it that, alas, will probably not be forthcoming, if Russian-controlled Crimea is any guide. Indeed, in Donbas so many were dependent on state employment and state subsidies that they had no sense of agency; they are turning to the side that seems more powerful, more capable of providing for them.

• Meanwhile, a week from Sunday, Ukrainians will vote for a new Parliament (Rada). But Donbas and Luhansk will probably not be represented for security and practical reasons. And so a "core Ukraine" with more Western values will have a stronger voice in Ukraine's new legislature. Hence, one could argue that Putin has done a lot to make Ukraine, politically, more pro-European and pro-Western! This tendency underscores that Putin's only real option now is to continue with a separatist gambit through military intervention, since Putin has succeeded, through military action, in turning most Ukrainians against him (and Russia).  

• Sadly, Ukraine's politicians and parties are lagging behind the progress of Ukraine's citizens and civil society. But without Russian meddling, this will change. 

• Umland and Churikova both agree that the language issue (Ukrainian vs. Russian) is an artificial one. For official state documents Ukrainian will remain the official language. And where most people speak Russian, as before Russian will be continued to be used and taught in schools, regardless of what the law says.

• ... As for the eastern Ukrainian oligarchs? The fact that the Akhmetov clan has seemed  to have very little influence in Donbas implies  that the pro-Russian insurgents, who are largely outsiders without any local constituency, must have enjoyed extraordinary support from Russia.

• ... Finally, Whitmore asked Umland and Churikova to speculate what will happen to Russia when, not if, Ukraine "gets to the West." Umland said that Putin "wants the Ukrainian experiment to fail" to discredit Ukraine's push to the West. And Umland thinks Putin is miscalculating that the EU would allow a destabilized Ukraine that could send thousands or even millions of refugees to the EU. Europe won't allow it. Churikova said that now in Russia "Ukraine means freedom" in all post-Soviet states and Putin will not allow it to spread; but it's a question whether Putin will direct all his forces to stop its spread. And what will happen when, and if, the Russian population "sobers up?" 

Podcast: Ukraine's Loyalist Russians

By Brian Whitmore

October 17, 2014 | RFE/RL - The Power Vertical

URL: http://www.rferl.org/content/podcast-ukraines-loyalist-russians/26642745.html

The myth of Russian humiliation and Western triumphalism

I myself have been guilty of giving the "Russia's humiliation" thesis some credence, probably because many ordinary Russians that I have met exhibit signs of an angry (or sometimes morose) inferiority complex to the West.  

(By the way, it's worth noting that, in an odd way, Russia is valuable to the West because all things become clear in opposition: without the bad example of post-Soviet Russia, we might forget what being the West  is really about. Indeed, over the past year the greater part of the West, the European Union, has recognized itself anew through the inspired eyes of Ukrainians who are determined to join the EU in affirmation of their truly "European values.")

Undoubtedly, many Russians feel humiliated to this day simply for losing the Cold War, (despite, as Anne Applebaum notes below, Russia's retaining many of the nukes and diplomatic spoils of the Soviet empire for itself alone). Then most Russians' saw their population size, savings and standard of living fall for over a decade; meanwhile, Russians have seen the rising standards of living in Poland, the Baltics and other Soviet satellites. Russia is a "great" and "civilizational" power with nuclear weapons, they must think, with a 142 million population and territory spanning two continents... yet how can Russia be falling behind its tiny former client states?  

On the flip side, it's worth remarking -- especially to any Russian unacquainted with average Americans -- that there is no counter feeling of triumphalism in the U.S. over winning the Cold War. It just isn't something we talk about much; and when we do, it's usually the older folks exhibiting their great relief, as in, "We are so glad that dangerous time is behind us now." It would be interesting to analyze why we Americans, who are so fond of spiking the ball and doing an endzone dance over any little trifle, refrain from doing so over the Cold War, but that's a discussion for another post.... Anyhow, the most upsetting thing an American can tell a Russian nowadays -- upsetting because it's true -- is that Americans don't think about Russia much at all. It would be better for their bruised egos if we offered them our hatred and fear rather than our naive disregard....

I am not an ordinary American because I do think about Russia. I don't offer Russians my hatred or fear; yet I'm definitely tired of wondering what ordinary Russians are wondering, or trying to commiserate with the good ones. No matter what I feel about individual Russians, the bottom line is that Russia is a problem state. "It has issues," to put it more politely. Russia's internal issues, of course, are hers to deal with. The problem is when Russia's issues spill over into the affairs of its sovereign neighbors, especially Ukraine, which President Putin does not recognize as a real nation or an actual state. Then my lack of sympathy for "humiliated" Russians turns to enmity. Their feelings of humiliation, or need for vindication, even if well-founded, don't give Russia the state the right to start wars with peaceful neighbors. 

I know, I know, ordinary Russian citizens didn't start any war in Ukraine; Russia's president Vladimir Putin did. Yet ordinary Russians' support of Putin -- which jumped after Russia's takeover of Crimea -- gave his military actions in Ukraine a kind of popular mandate ex post facto, while motivating Putin to continue his Ukrainian gambit in Donbas. 

The myth of Russian humiliation

By Anne Applebaum 

October 17, 2014 | Washington Post

Looking back over the past quarter-century, it isn’t easy to name a Western policy that can truly be described as a success. The impact of Western development aid is debatable. Western interventions in the Middle East have been disastrous.

But one Western policy stands out as a phenomenal success, particularly when measured against the low expectations with which it began: the integration of Central Europe and the Baltic States into the European Union and NATO. Thanks to this double project, more than 90 million people have enjoyed relative safety and relative prosperity for more than two decades in a region whose historic instability helped launch two world wars.

These two “expansions,” which were parallel but not identical (some countries are members of one organization but not the other), were transformative because they were not direct leaps, as the word “expansion” implies, but slow negotiations. Before joining NATO, each country had to establish civilian control of its army. Before joining the European Union, each adopted laws on trade, judiciary, human rights. As a result, they became democracies. This was “democracy promotion” working as it never has before or since.

But times change, and the miraculous transformation of a historically unstable region became a humdrum reality. Instead of celebrating this achievement on the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is now fashionable to opine that this expansion, and of NATO in particular, was mistaken. This project is incorrectly “remembered” as the result of American “triumphalism” that somehow humiliated Russia by bringing Western institutions into its rickety neighborhood. This thesis is usually based on revisionist history promoted by the current Russian regime — and it is wrong.

For the record: No treaties prohibiting NATO expansion were ever signed with Russia. No promises were broken. Nor did the impetus for NATO expansion come from a “triumphalist” Washington. On the contrary, Poland’s first efforts to apply in 1992 were rebuffed. I well remember the angry reaction of the U.S. ambassador to Warsaw at the time. But Poland and others persisted, precisely because they were already seeing signs of the Russian revanchism to come.

When the slow, cautious expansion eventually took place, constant efforts were made to reassure Russia. No NATO bases were placed in the new member states, and until 2013 no exercises were conducted there. A Russia-NATO agreement in 1997 promised no movement of nuclear installations. A NATO-Russia Council was set up in 2002. In response to Russian objections, Ukraine and Georgia were, in fact, denied NATO membership plans in 2008.

Meanwhile, not only was Russia not “humiliated” during this era, it was given de facto “great power” status, along with the Soviet seat on the U.N. Security Council and Soviet embassies. Russia also received Soviet nuclear weapons, some transferred from Ukraine in 1994 in exchange for Russian recognition of Ukraine’s borders. Presidents Clinton and Bush both treated their Russian counterparts as fellow “great power” leaders and invited them to join the Group of Eight — although Russia, neither a large economy nor a democracy, did not qualify.

During this period, Russia, unlike Central Europe, never sought to transform itself along European lines. Instead, former KGB officers with a clearly expressed allegiance to the Soviet system took over the state in league with organized crime, seeking to prevent the formation of democratic institutions at home and to undermine them abroad. For the past decade, this kleptocratic clique has also sought to re-create an empire, using everything from cyberattacks on Estonia to military invasions of Georgia and now Ukraine, in open violation of that 1994 agreement — exactly as the Central Europeans feared.

Once we remember what actually happened over the past two decades, as opposed to accepting the Russian regime’s version, our own mistakes look different. In 1991, Russia was no longer a great power in either population or economic terms. So why didn’t we recognize reality, reform the United Nations and give a Security Council seat to India, Japan or others? Russia did not transform itself along European lines. Why did we keep pretending that it had? Eventually, our use of the word “democracy” to describe the Russian political system discredited the word in Russia itself.

The crisis in Ukraine, and the prospect of a further crisis in NATO itself, is not the result of our triumphalism but of our failure to react to Russia’s aggressive rhetoric and its military spending. Why didn’t we move NATO bases eastward a decade ago? Our failure to do so has now led to a terrifying plunge of confidence in Central Europe. Countries once eager to contribute to the alliance are now afraid. A string of Russian provocations unnerve the Baltic region: the buzzing of Swedish airspace, the kidnapping of an Estonian security officer.

Our mistake was not to humiliate Russia but to underrate Russia’s revanchist, revisionist, disruptive potential. If the only real Western achievement of the past quarter-century is now under threat, that’s because we have failed to ensure that NATO continues to do in Europe what it was always meant to do: deter. Deterrence is not an aggressive policy; it is a defensive policy. But in order to work, deterrence has to be real. It requires investment, consolidation and support from all of the West, and especially the United States. I’m happy to blame American triumphalism for many things, but in Europe I wish there had been more of it.

Pentagon is planning for global warming

This libertarian, Koch- and Hagel-loving Nazi that I correspond with blamed this story on President Obama, of course. So I told him that he had sorely underestimated our nation's military. Why?

Because our military can't afford to engage in short-term corporate thinking where the C-levels and middle managers still make out if it all goes to shit. We have islands sinking, military bases flooding, unrest and potential wars over fresh water resources... the U.S. military must understand and plan for all of it, regardless of his dumb corporate/FOX news agenda of denying what's happening. They can't afford denial; they must be right. 

Incidentally, is it any wonder that rah-rah military guy Sen. John McCain of all Republicans gets it? He said if the scientists are wrong about global warming then the costs are manageable and we get all these wonderful sustainable energy technologies to boot; but if we're wrong, and unprepared, the costs will be ginormous and the consequences unpredictable and unmanageable.  

Unlike some other liberals I have a lot of respect for the U.S. military, not least because they are the most forward-thinking, long-term planning organization you will find in the world. Sure, some of the generals have cushy corporate or lobbying jobs waiting for them when they jump ship, but as an organization it's all about the mission, and how they define potential threats and safety are not determined by the POTUS; these are concepts always in flux and under their monitoring.  

Pentagon: global warming will change how US military trains and goes to war

By Suzanne Goldenberg

October 13, 2014 | Guardian

URL: http://gu.com/p/42d6z

Jimmy John's non-compete agreements are corporate BULLSHIT

Bullshit!  Non-compete agreements are a bullshit practice to begin with... but in the sandwich-making business? Gimme a break!

This is corporate heavy-handed baloney. These are at-will, hourly employees with zero job security, and yet they are pressured to sign two-year non-compete agreements with any company that might make a sandwich?!  (Probably their only career option if they get fired from Jimmy John's.) The gall of Jimmy John's just boggles the mind. 

I'm not buying any of their shityy sandwiches. You do the same, if you care about the working man.

Meanwhile, we need national laws banning non-compete agreements except in exceptional circumstances. I mean, for Christsake, if you can make a sandwich is that really top-secret company knowledge?! 

P.S. -- About a month ago I visited Jimmy John's near my house once just out of curiosity and there was a black guy at the cash register -- it doesn't matter that he was black, except that only 3.4 percent of people in my voting district are black... -- and he was leaning on a cane with a broken leg. I commiserated and asked how he was doing, we exchanged pleasantries and I wished him well, but... I worry about that guy and guys like him who have no choice but to work on broken legs just to earn minimum wage as a cashier, with all this non-compete and corporate baloney on top of it. 

UPDATE (10.22.2014): Just to be accurate and fair to individual JJ franchisees, it's up to each of them to decide to use these non-compete agreements or not. It's not clear how many JJ restaurants actually do, and if they do, for all their employees or just some. Regardless, it's a stupid corporate policy suggestion from Jimmy John's and is certainly winning them tons of negative PR and perhaps upcoming federal action. See: "Jimmy John's Noncompete Agreement Comes Under Congressional Scrutiny." 


Jimmy John's Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign 'Oppressive' Noncompete Agreements
By Dave Jamieson
October 13, 2014 | Huffington Post

URL: http://huff.to/1sIvxpS