Marine Lt. Gen.: U.S. must arm Ukraine against Russian invaders

(HT: KP) Read the truth about Ukraine from a Jarhead Lt. General!

I will go further and merely repeat what most Ukrainians say: Ukraine's military was deliberately underfunded and robbed by the regime of President Yanukovych. In this unnaturally weakened state, Ukraine's military was forced to meet its most serious challenge yet: Putin's "masked" regular soldiers and paid Russian mercenaries using Russian armor and heavy weapons. 

Ukraine's brave army has reconstituted itself and is surviving now on super-human will and private donations from the populace -- everything from boots to blankets and bandages. But as Ukraine's President Poroshenko exhorted the U.S. Senate, "...one cannot win the war with blankets."

Ukraine needs defensive weaponry from the U.S., as former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has been advocating for months now: "anti-tank weapons, hand-held anti-tank weapons, hand-held rockets -- weapons capable for use in urban short range fighting."

By the way, in addition to national intelligence agencies publishing their reports, Amnesty International in September concluded, based on copious evidence, that, "there is no doubt that Russia is an active party to the conflict" in Ukraine. 

A case for doing more for Ukraine

By Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling (ret.)

November 28, 2014 | Marine Times

During the latter part of my military career, I saw Ukraine's Army on exercises, in Balkan Peacekeeping Operations, and in combat. Early assessment: they had tough soldiers, and extremely bad senior officers. In the Balkans, they siphoned gas and sold it on the black market. In Iraq during the Sadr uprising of 2004, they never left their bases, and they sold ammunition to the insurgents.

Later in Iraq and Afghanistan — due to preparatory training at U.S. facilities in Germany prior to deploying and better leadership — their force began to improve. Slowly.

By 2012, the Ukrainian Army was becoming increasingly capable. My Ukrainian Army counterpart helped develop Ukraine's 2006 Defense White Paper, outlining steps to achieve a professional military led by a trained and educated officer and non-commissioned officer corps.

But the military transformation was consistently hindered by societal corruption, an excessively lean (.07% of GDP) defense budget, and a too large general officer corps, many of whom were hidebound, fat, proud of their Soviet military education, and adverse to change.

In early 2014, Ukraine's military was severely tested. But even with Putin's interference in the Kiev government and separatist activity in the Crimea and other eastern provinces, I predicted the Army of Ukraine would stand and fight in the east. It wouldn't be pretty, I told several journalists, but a revived nationalism and improved training and military leadership would count on the battlefield. And early on, Ukraine's Army did stand.

The early battles were artillery duels, with Ukraine's Special Operations Force courageously contributing. But that is about to change in Phase II of the campaign. Separatists are increasingly reinforced by a technologically-advanced, combined arms organization with large caliber rocket artillery, precise air defense missiles, layers of intelligence gathering drones, strong logistics, and a strategic information operation campaign generated by a Russian leader who believes he must win at any cost. It could get very ugly — and one-sided.

In the past nine months, U.S. governmental and military officials have continued to comment on Ukraine's political situation, their military capabilities, and their economic environment. Ukraine is — to be sure — fighting for survival on multiple fronts: military, governmental, and economic. But they are also fighting to gain support from western governments who are focused perhaps too much on the Islamic State group and Ebola, and not enough on values and the international standard of national self-determination.

If there is a positive to be found in this conflict, I saw it during a visit to Kiev in November. My military background has taught me that those who adapt during conflict the fastest, tend to survive. Ukraine is adapting, and fast. Faster than they have in the past.

They are no longer talking about gradual change, eradication of corruption, elimination of the old guard, budget reform, and military transformation. They have developed plans to do all these things, and they have a group of young mavericks who are smart and up to the task of leading and acting. War and the specter of potential destruction provide a passion and energized focus that quickly overcomes inertia.

We must help them. Vice President Biden also visited Ukraine in November, and while he likely did not give Ukraine all the support they need, I sincerely hope he has offered more support in a variety of areas. The U.S. needs to continue actively supporting Ukraine, even as we are faced with other crisis.

We must expand economic sanctions against Russia. We must find new ways to counter the information campaign Mr. Putin is waging. We must influence NATO and EU nations to make the continued hard choices that show Mr. Putin we stand united in not allowing this attack on a sovereign nation to stand. And, we must increase our training, advising, and assisting Ukraine's military in the face of bold aggression.

"We don't have a lot of real support for saving Ukraine," said a representative from the office of Ukraine's President in answering that question, "but for the first time, our countrymen are giving us support for creating a new Ukraine. I hope that will be enough to see us through this crisis."

One young Member of Parliament mentioned she had studied our American Revolution, and she had learned we did pretty well in forming a new government, even when a superior force was attacking us. She reminded me we had a little help from the French. "Yes," she said, "we could use some of that kind of help."

The U.S., and Western Europe, should give it.

Brzezinski: How to confront Russian chauvanism

Seasoned Russia expert Zbigniew Brzezinski offered remarks on "the Ukraine problem" at the Wilson Center on June 16.  Here are the most important excerpts, [emphasis mine]:

It follows from what I’m saying that the Ukrainian problem is a challenge that the West must address on three levels. We have to effectively deter the temptation facing the Russian leadership regarding the use of force. We have to deter the use of force, simply put.

We have to, secondly, obtain the termination of Russia’s deliberate efforts at the destabilization of parts of Ukraine. It’s very hard to judge how ambitious these goals are, but it is not an accident that in that one single portion of Ukraine in which the Russians actually predominate, the use of force has been sophisticated. The participants in the effort have been well armed, even with tanks, and certainly with effective anti-aircraft weaponry. All of that is something that even disagreeable, disaffected citizens of a country to which they feel they do not belong would not be storing somewhere in their attic or in their basement. These are weapons provided, in effect, for the purpose of shaping formations capable of sustaining serious military engagements. It is a form of interstate aggression. You can’t call it anything else. How would we feel if all of a sudden, let’s say, the drug-oriented gangs in the United States were armed from abroad, from our southern neighbor, by equipment which would promote violence on that scale on a continuing basis? So this is a serious challenge. So that is the second objective.

And the third objective is to promote and then discuss with the Russians a formula for an eventual compromise, assuming that in the first instance the use of force openly and on a large scale is deterred and the effort to destabilize is abandoned. That means, in turn, the following: And I will be quite blunt regarding my own views on the subject. Ukraine has to be supported if it is to resist. If Ukraine doesn’t resist—if its internal disorder persists and the state is not able to organize effective national defense, then the Ukraine problem will be resolved unilaterally, but probably with consequential effects that will be destabilizing in regards to the vulnerable states and to the East-West relationship as a whole. And the forces of chauvinism inside Russia will become more strident. And they do represent the most negative aspects of contemporary Russian society: a kind of thirst for nationalism, for self-fulfillment, gratification of the exercise of power. Something which is not pervasive in the new middle class, which is the longer range alternative.

Importantly, he adds, 

There’s no point trying to arm the Ukrainians to take on the Russian army in the open field: thousands of tanks, an army organized for the application of overwhelming force. [...]

Accordingly, I feel that we should make it clear to the Ukrainians that if they are determined to resist, as they say they are and seemingly they are trying to do so (albeit not very effectively), we will provide them with anti-tank weapons, hand-held anti-tank weapons, hand-held rockets—weapons capable for use in urban short range fighting. This is not an arming of Ukraine for some invasion of Russia. You don’t invade a country as large as Russia with defensive weaponry. But if you have defensive weaponry and you have access to it and know it’s arriving, you’re more likely to resist. 

And finally, on Ukraine's eventual joining in the EU, and the future of NATO:

I think it’s relatively simple: Ukraine can proceed with its process, publicly endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian people, of becoming part of Europe. But it’s a long process. The Turks have been promised that outcome, and they have been engaging in that process already for 60 years. In other words, it’s not done very quickly. Therefore, the danger to Russia is not imminent and the negative consequences are not so destructive.

But at the same time, there should be clarity that Ukraine will not be a member of NATO. I think that is important for a variety of political reasons. If you look at the map, it’s important for Russia from a psychological, strategic point of view. So Ukraine will not be a member of NATO. But by the same token, Russia has to understand that Ukraine will not be a member of some mythical Eurasian Union that President Putin is trying to promote on the basis of this new doctrine of a special position for Russia in the world. 

I guess it's so fundamental it goes without saying, but... Brzezinski doesn't mention that any compromise must allow Putin to save face, since his adventures in Ukraine are primarily about boosting his public support at home, not securing any strategic military or economic objectives abroad. There is no party, politburo, public or parliament behind Mr. Putin whom the West may appeal to, or appease.  To me this is the West's biggest problem, because in Putin we face a charismatic autocrat whose image as a "strong Russian standing up to the West" is more important to him than any stretch of land or increase in GDP.

Confronting Russian Chauvinism

By Zbigniew Brzezinski 

June 27, 2014 | The American Interest

URL: http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/06/27/confronting-russian-chauvinism/