Showing posts with label government contracting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label government contracting. Show all posts

Sunday, October 6, 2013

Pentagon is largest U.S. employer

Yes, the federal government is too big, and this proves it: the Pentagon has 400,000 civilian employees


This is not counting the 700,000 or so civilian contractors who also work for the Defense Department.

Nor does it count, of course, our 1.4 million active-duty members of the armed services, and 850,000 reservists and National Guard troops.

So altogether, about one percent of the U.S. population works for the Pentagon.

That may not sound like a lot, but that makes it America's largest employer with about 3.3 million. By comparison, America's largest private employer Walmart has only 1.3 million workers.

Furthermore, the Pentagon's annual "income" from taxpayers dwarfs Walmart's in the U.S. by 25 times: $682 billion vs. $27 billion!  (2012 figures).

So why aren't my fellow Americans in the Tea Parties complaining and agitating to shrink America's bloated defense budget?  

P.S. -- To head off some predictable retorts, first check out this fact sheet from the Center for International Policy, "Myths vs. Realities of Pentagon Spending."

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

DOS 'whistleblower': Nation-building FAIL

More than a few State Dept. officers disagree with Van Buren, and personally distrust his motivations (write a provocative book at/near retirement and get rich and famous) instead of blowing the whistle internally and trying to change the system from within.

Myself, I have a problem with his "greedy contractors"/"corrupt bureaucrats" line.  First, contractors don't write the contracts, the government does.  They just bid on the work and then implement it.  Secondly, Van Buren presents no evidence of U.S. government corruption.  

If Van Buren meant corruption within the Iraqi and Afghan governments, then, well, duh.  We never should have expected to funnel $ billions through these nascent institutions and trust all the money to be well-spent or even accounted for.  But in fact, trying to spend a lot of money fast -- and this was a hell of a lot to spend on development, more than any nation had ever tried to spend before in such a short time -- no matter who was managing it, was bound to lead to waste, poor accounting, missed and moving targets, sloppy work, etc.  

Those disagreements aside, Van Buren's central points are true and bear repeating: 1) using development aid as a counter-insurgency tactic almost never works; and 2) in our arrogance and cultural blindness we have failed to understand that they don't want to be like us, they don't even want most of our stuff.  This is especially true in Afghanistan.


Why has the US spent so much money and time "so disastrously trying to rebuild occupied nations abroad"?
By Peter Van Buren
August 28, 2012 | Al Jazeera

Friday, August 17, 2012

Ryan family fortune from gov't railroad, highway projects

Looks like Payl Ryan is in good company with those Tea Party masterminds, the evil Koch Bros., whose family fortune came from contracts with Stalin to build up the USSR's oil infrastructure.

(Now let's see whether the lib'rul media runs with this story on Ryan's hypocrisy, or just buries it....).


Paul Ryan is a living, breathing GOP example of how public infrastructure and private entrepreneurship work hand-in-hand.
August 15, 2012 | Salon

Thursday, June 23, 2011

10 firms get 25% of all USG contract money

Yep.


By Neil Gordon
June 21, 2011 | Project On Government Oversight

The federal government awarded $537 billion in contracts to more than 300,000 entities last year. However, as AllGov recently reported, about 25 percent of that amount went to just 10 companies –- Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, United Technologies, L-3 Communications, Oshkosh Corporation, SAIC, and BAE Systems -–the top 10 federal contractors in FY2010. The fact that these companies are primarily defense contractors isn't surprising given that the Department of Defense typically accounts for two-thirds to three-quarters of all contract spending each year.

[...]

Explore the misconduct profiles of the top ten federal contractors in POGO's Federal Contractor Misconduct Database.

Saturday, February 2, 2008

More U.S. military contractors under fire

This story just confirms a lot of things I've been saying for a few years. Anybody who knows a bit about government contracting knows that, comparatively, the Pentagon has done it really quick & dirty in Iraq, with poor planning, no gov't oversight personnel, and no incentives for contractor performance.

More broadly, the unprecedented level of outsourcing in Iraq & Afghanistan is a result of domestic political opposition to large troop numbers overseas; the fact that we're fighting two wars in two theaters simultaneously, in addition to the over 800 U.S. bases which must be manned worldwide; the downsizing of our military after the Cold War; crony capitalism, where GOP-friendly contractors can lobby for easy, no-compete contracts; and an anti-government ideology which says that private contractors can do anything better than the gov't -- even when it comes to fighting America's wars.

In all these wars we've started, perhaps we forgot about a little thing called patriotism? Our soldiers don't fight and die just for the paycheck. They embody a code of honor, and fight for love of country. Call me crazy, but I doubt any private contractor measures up to that standard.




Military Contractors Are Hard to Fire
By Richard Lardner
February 2, 2008 | Associated Press

ITT Federal Services International, a defense contractor hired to maintain battle gear for U.S. troops in Iraq, repeatedly failed to do the job right.

Combat vehicles ITT declared as repaired and ready for action flunked inspections and had to be fixed again. Equipment to be sanitized for return to the United States was found caked with dirt. And ITT's computer database for tracking the work was rife with errors.

Formal "letters of concern" were sent to the contractor. Still, the Army didn't fire ITT. Instead, it gave the Colorado Springs, Colo.-based company more work to do. Since October 2004, ITT has been paid $638 million through the Global Maintenance and Supply Services contract.

The Army's ongoing arrangement with ITT, detailed in an audit from the Government Accountability Office, shows how captive the military has become to the private sector for overseas support. Even when contractors don't measure up, dismissing them may not be an option because of the heavy pace of operations.

Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo., co-author of legislation creating a special commission to examine wartime contracting, said poor-performing contractors are more likely to get bonuses than to be penalized.

"It has just been a mess," McCaskill, a former state auditor, said in an interview with The Associated Press. "It's bad enough how much this war is costing. But it's heartbreaking the amount of money that has just gone up in smoke."

In ITT's case, there were too few soldiers to handle the maintenance duties and no other contractors ready to step in quickly, according to Redding Hobby, the Army Sustainment Command's executive director for field support operations.

"I'm not sure that our manning levels would have allowed us to do anything except wring our hands and worry and work people harder and work people overtime," Hobby said in a telephone interview.

In a brief statement, ITT said it objected to the GAO's conclusions and has "taken numerous corrective actions." The company also said it has met the Army's requirements.

Contract personnel working for the Defense Department now outnumber U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan; there are 196,000 private-sector workers in both countries compared to 182,000 troops.

Contractors are responsible for a slew of duties, including repairing warfighting equipment, supplying food and water, building barracks, providing armed security and gathering intelligence.

The dependence has come with serious consequences.

During a congressional hearing on Jan. 24, Jack Bell, a senior Pentagon acquisition official, called the situation "unprecedented" and one "that, frankly, we were not adequately prepared to address."

A shortage of experienced federal employees to oversee this growing industrial army is blamed for much of the waste, fraud and abuse on contracts collectively worth billions of dollars.

"We do not have the contracting personnel that we need to guarantee that the taxpayer dollar is being protected," said William Moser, the State Department's deputy assistant secretary for logistics management.

"We are very, very concerned about the integrity in the contracting process," added Moser, who appeared at the same hearing as Bell. "We don't feel that we've had major scandals up to now, but we don't feel like that we can continue in the same situation."

The office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has 52 open cases related to bribery, false billing, contract fraud, kickbacks and theft; 36 of those cases have been referred to the Justice Department for prosecution, according to the inspector general's office.

The Army Criminal Investigation Command is busy, too. The command has 90 criminal investigations under way related to alleged contract fraud in Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan, according to spokesman Chris Grey. Two dozen U.S. citizens have been charged or indicted so far — 19 of those are Army military and civilian employees — and more than $15 million in bribes has changed hands, Grey said.

To deal with the problem, the Army is implementing many of the recommendations of a blue-ribbon panel formed last year to reform contracting procedures. The most significant are the creation of a contracting command to be led by a two-star general and the addition of 1,400 acquisition personnel.

[Well it's about time. This is what I've been saying all along! -- J]

David Maddox, a retired four-star general who served on the panel, said the Army understands the need to change. He's less sure the message has spread throughout the Defense Department. That's necessary to drive the broader changes needed to curb future problems in defense contracting.

"The Army is moving out," Maddox said. "I'm a little more concerned with the degree DoD is moving out."

The audit by the GAO, Congress' investigative arm, does not say there were any improprieties stemming from the ITT contract. Rather, neither the contractor nor the government were ready for the demands placed on each.

At one point, although the Army had documented several incidents of poor performance, ITT was paid an additional $33 million to overhaul 150 Humvees a month. Over a nearly yearlong period, the contractor never came close to meeting the mark but still got the money, according to the GAO.

Many of the problems occurred in 2005 and 2006, when the insurgency in Iraq was at its height and there was a heavy burden on the contractor to get equipment back into the fight as quickly as possible, according to Hobby, the Army Sustainment Command official.

The terms of the contract called for ITT to be compensated for all labor costs. That meant the company was often paid twice to fix equipment it didn't repair correctly the first time.

"Although it sounds bad economically, back at the time we were trying to (implement) a repair program that would maintain equipment for our soldiers, and that was a good alternative," Hobby said of the ITT contract. "It was expensive. We knew there were risks there. And, quite frankly, we didn't have the government (personnel) in place to ensure success. But we've learned an awful lot of lessons from this."

The ITT contract and other similar support arrangements will be changed so a company's profits are linked to performance, Hobby said.

"We are transitioning to a contract that gives an incentive to the contractor," Hobby said. "Our argument would be, 'We paid you to fix these vehicles, they didn't get fixed on time, so you lose your award fee.' A penalty, so to speak."

ITT's performance has improved substantially, Hobby said, and the Army will decide in the next few months whether to extend the arrangement for another year.

Still, he doesn't diminish the gravity of the GAO's audit.

"I think if Joe Sixpack or Sally Homemaker read that report, they would probably have the same feeling," Hobby said when asked why ITT's contract was not terminated. "I share your pain."

Monday, July 9, 2007

CIA already half-privatized

Remember when I rebutted a Weekly Standard op-ed entitled "Privatize the CIA?"

Well, according to Hillhouse, over the past 5-10 years the CIA has been largely privatized anyway, with fewer "blue badge" CIA employees supervising more and more "green badge" private contractors.


This is privatization run amok.

It's very, very troubling. Read on!...


Who Runs the CIA? Outsiders for Hire.
By R.J. Hillhouse
July 8, 2007 | Washington Post

Red alert: Our national security is being outsourced.

The most intriguing secrets of the "war on terror" have nothing to do with al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers. They're about the mammoth private spying industry that all but runs U.S. intelligence operations today.

Surprised? No wonder. In April, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell was poised to publicize a year-long examination of outsourcing by U.S. intelligence agencies. But the report was inexplicably delayed -- and suddenly classified a national secret. What McConnell doesn't want you to know is that the private spy industry has succeeded where no foreign government has: It has penetrated the CIA and is running the show.

Over the past five years (some say almost a decade), there has been a revolution in the intelligence community toward wide-scale outsourcing. Private companies now perform key intelligence-agency functions, to the tune, I'm told, of more than $42 billion a year. Intelligence professionals tell me that more than 50 percent of the National Clandestine Service (NCS) -- the heart, brains and soul of the CIA -- has been outsourced to private firms such as Abraxas, Booz Allen Hamilton, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon.

These firms recruit spies, create non-official cover identities and control the movements of CIA case officers. They also provide case officers and watch officers at crisis centers and regional desk officers who control clandestine operations worldwide. As the Los Angeles Times first reported last October, more than half the workforce in two key CIA stations in the fight against terrorism -- Baghdad and Islamabad, Pakistan -- is made up of industrial contractors, or "green badgers," in CIA parlance.

Intelligence insiders say that entire branches of the NCS have been outsourced to private industry. These branches are still managed by U.S. government employees ("blue badgers") who are accountable to the agency's chain of command. But beneath them, insiders say, is a supervisory structure that's controlled entirely by contractors; in some cases, green badgers are managing green badgers from other corporations.

Sensing problems -- and possibly fearing congressional action -- the CIA recently conducted a hasty review of all of its job classifications to determine which perform "essential government functions" that should not be outsourced. But it's highly doubtful that such a short-term exercise can comprehensively identify the proper "blue/green" mix, especially because contractors' work statements have long been carefully formulated to blur the distinction between approvable and debatable functions.

Although the contracting system is Byzantine, there's no question that the private sector delivers high-quality professional intelligence services. Outsourcing has provided solutions to personnel-management problems that have always plagued the CIA's operations side. Rather than tying agents up in the kind of office politics that government employees have to engage in to advance their careers, outsourcing permits them to focus on what they do best, which boosts morale and performance. Privatization also immediately increased the number of trained, experienced agents in the field after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

Even though wide-scale outsourcing may not immediately endanger national security, it's worrisome. The contractors in charge of espionage are still chiefly CIA alumni who have absorbed its public service values. But as the center of gravity shifts from the public sector to the private, more than one independent intelligence firm has developed plans to "raise" succeeding generations of officers within its own training systems. These corporate-grown agents will be inculcated with corporate values and ethics, not those of public service.

And the current piecemeal system has introduced some vulnerabilities. Historically, the system offered members of the intelligence community the kind of stability that ensured that they would keep its secrets. That dynamic is now being eroded. Contracts come and go. So do workforces. The spies of the past came of age professionally in a strong extended family, but the spies of the future will be more like children raised in multiple foster homes -- at risk.

Today, when Booz Allen Hamilton loses a contract to SAIC, people rush from one to the other in a game of musical chairs, with not enough chairs for all the workers who possess both the highest security clearances and expertise in the art of espionage. Some inevitably lose out. Any good counterintelligence officer knows what can happen next. Down-on-their-luck spies begin to do what spies do best: spy. Other companies offer them jobs in exchange for industry secrets. Foreign governments approach them. And some day, terrorists will clue in to this potential workforce.

The director of national intelligence has put our security at risk by classifying the study on outsourcing and keeping the truth about this inadequately planned and managed system out of the light. Much of what has been outsourced makes sense, but much of the structure doesn't, not for the longer term. It's time for the public and Congress to demand the study's release. More important, it's past time for the industry -- an industry conceived of and run by some of the best and brightest the CIA has ever produced -- to come up with the kind of innovative solutions it's legendary for, before the damage goes too deep.