P.S. -- My opposition to the Iraq occupation was the main reason I started this blog over six years ago. One of my first posts was a revenge fantasy written in sickened response to a brief, barely noticed AP article about how Dubya was "moved" during his annual pre-Christmas visit to wounded soldiers. When it dawned on me that this had already become a kind of holiday tradition for him and his wife, I knew the occupation was too old and institutionalized. I don't know if Dubya still visits wounded Iraq vets; but he will certainly have the opportunity to continue visiting them until his dying day, even if he lives another 80 years, the smug fucker.
Your one-stop shop for news, views and getting clues. I AM YOUR INFORMATION FILTER, since 2006.
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Dying Iraq vet's letter to Bush-Cheney
P.S. -- My opposition to the Iraq occupation was the main reason I started this blog over six years ago. One of my first posts was a revenge fantasy written in sickened response to a brief, barely noticed AP article about how Dubya was "moved" during his annual pre-Christmas visit to wounded soldiers. When it dawned on me that this had already become a kind of holiday tradition for him and his wife, I knew the occupation was too old and institutionalized. I don't know if Dubya still visits wounded Iraq vets; but he will certainly have the opportunity to continue visiting them until his dying day, even if he lives another 80 years, the smug fucker.
Friday, September 28, 2012
Wisdom, not weakness
We intervened in Libya alongside a broad coalition and with the mandate of the United Nations Security Council, because we had the ability to stop the slaughter of innocents and because we believed that the aspirations of the people were more powerful than a tyrant.And as we meet here, we again declare that the regime of Bashar al-Assad must come to an end so that the suffering of the Syrian people can stop and a new dawn can begin.We have taken these positions because we believe that freedom and self-determination are not unique to one culture.These are not simply American values or Western values; they are universal values.
Make no mistake: A nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained. It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations, and the stability of the global economy. It risks triggering a nuclear arms race in the region, and the unraveling of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Sunday, September 16, 2012
Zakaria: A 'red line' for U.S. but not Israel?
Notice that while Netanyahu assails Obama for refusing to draw a clear line, he himself has not drawn such a line. Israel has not specified an activity or enrichment level it would consider a casus belli.The reason is obvious: Doing so would restrict Israel’s options and signal its actions and timetable to Iran. If it doesn’t make sense for Israel to do this, why would it make sense for the United States?
Friday, August 17, 2012
FOX: Iran says...
Monday, March 12, 2012
What are Iran's motives?
As Israel plays up the country's nuclear threat, the west should be seeking active dialogue with Tehran
By Peter Beaumont
March 11, 2012 | Observer
"Actions," said Samuel Johnson in his life of the English poet Abraham Cowley, "are visible." What are secret, Johnson added pointedly, are "motives".
In the case of Iran's nuclear programme what we know of Tehran's actions and motives are the following.
With some degree of "overall credibility" – according to the 2011 board of governors' report from the International Atomic Energy Agency – we know that Tehran, in all likelihood, made active studies of technologies associated with nuclear weapon design and payload design. By and large, the report believes, that activity ceased in 2003, coincident with the US-led invasion of Iraq.
We know, too, because it has been even more visible, that Iran has come close to mastering the nuclear fuel cycle as well, including enrichment of uranium up to 20%.
The problem with the present dangerous debate, as it has been framed ever-more closely through the exclusive prism of Israel's security concerns and its ever-louder threats to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, is that far from illuminating what actually motivates Iran in its nuclear ambitions, it has tended to obscure Tehran's motives instead.
So what does Iran really want?
Writing in 2009, Kayhan Barzegar, an expert on Iran who has taught both in Tehran and in the US, described what he called the "paradox of Iran's nuclear consensus". He was attempting to lay bare the complex and competing historical, political and strategic considerations behind the theocratic regime's nuclear decision-making processes.
Referencing two centuries of internal criticism of Iran's failure "to acquire substantial power, influence and wealth", Barzegar cites more recent history that has persuaded many Iranians, not least in the country's elites, that the west, and Britain and America in particular, have long conspired to throw obstacles in the way of Iran's development both economically and as a major regional player.
From an Iranian point of view, there is ample evidence of this: from the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh's government in a CIA and MI6-led coup in 1953, after he nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, to western resistance to the shah's Esfahan steel manufacturing project to President Clinton's killing off a $1bn deal for the US energy company Conoco to develop offshore oil fields. It is a suspicion that has been amplified by the country's post-Islamic revolution politics.
Indeed, one of the bleakest of historical ironies is that the early revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini actually halted the western-supported civil nuclear programme in place under the shah and it was only persuaded that it needed to acquire nuclear weapons technology because of Iran's massive losses in the war with Iraq, then supported by the US, which saw Iran targeted with chemical weapons.
It is these twin considerations – a combination of desire for deterrence in a neighbourhood where there are five nuclear powers and a sense of frustrated regional ambitions – that have long driven Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology, summed up in its 20-year strategic plan, ratified by its powerful expediency council, which calls for Iran to "rank first in the region".
Iran's decision-making over its nuclear programme, not least its pursuit of weapons technology, is complicated by a number of other factors. Indeed, the 2010 US National Intelligence Estimate, in agreement with other analysts, argued that far from having already concluded it would build a bomb at any cost, Tehran is more flexible on the issue, "guided by a cost-benefit approach", a judgment recently endorsed by 16 US agencies that have studied the issue and concluded there is no evidence Iran is actively trying to build a bomb.
Indeed, as Barzegar argued: "There are quite a number of reasons why, from the perspective of the Iranian leadership, weaponisation is untenable, unnecessary and unwise."
If Iran's deliberate policy of ambiguity is one complicating factor, a second and equally important issue is how the nuclear programme, and the consequent international pressure on Tehran, has become ever more politicised in both the factional wrangling within the regime and the country's wider politics.
That has meant, counterintuitively perhaps, that as international pressure on Iran over its nuclear ambitions has increased, it has made it harder, not easier, for the regime to come to an accommodation as even some leading members of the Green opposition have criticised President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for any perceived concessions.
If the motivation of Iran is far more complex than that described by the present, simplistic debate, a question needs to be asked, too, about the motivation of Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, and those of his Israeli allies who have been pushing most vigorously for military action.
With not even 20% of Israelis believing that Israel should launch a unilateral attack against Iran, according to one poll, and the country divided over how effective a joint Israeli-US strike would be (Israel is not in a position to act alone), Netanyahu, even as he lectured American supporters, has failed to convince his own public.
More cynically, as a recent column in the Economist argued, Netanyahu's promotion of the threat posed by Iran, described in evermore apocalyptic terms, has been a convenient piece of "displacement" by an Israeli leader absolutely determined to avoid any meaningful engagement with the Palestinian peace process or bring an end to the occupation of the West Bank.
Because of this, a debate that should be about Iran's real nuclear ambitions and motives, and about how to engage with the regime constructively to prevent further proliferation, has been hijacked by a largely false premise.
For those of us who were intimate observers of the headlong charge to war against Iraq, it seems nothing more than a dispiriting rerun, not least in David Cameron's hyperbolic claim – counter to the weight of all current available evidence – that Iran is actively pursuing the construction of a intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten the west, an assertion eerily reminiscent of Tony Blair's untrue claim that Iraq could strike British interests within "45 minutes".
A war with Iran is not inevitable, but it might yet become so if the debate does not become both more honest and realistic. Indeed, the west has misread Iran for the best part of a century and more, not least since the country's revolution.
To go to war twice in the Gulf within the space of a decade based on rhetoric, lies and misunderstanding would not simply be a tragedy but an utter catastrophe that would shame the west.
Friday, March 9, 2012
Chomsky: The truth of attack on Iran
Thursday, March 8, 2012
58% of Israelis opposed to strike on Iran without U.S. backing
Dire results of a preemptive attack on Iran
Israel can't do long-term, severe damage to Iran's nuclear infrastructure, so its chief purpose in bombing Iran would be to trigger Iranian retaliation and draw the U.S. into the war to defend Israel, and to finish off what Israel started.
Israeli spy chiefs: Stop drumbeat of war against Iran
"If I'm sitting here in the month of March 2012 reading [Romney's latest op-ed on Iran], and I'm an Iranian leader, what do I understand? I have nine more months to run as fast as I can because this is going to be terrible if the other guys get in."
"The regime in Iran is a very rational one," says the former top Israeli spymaster. And President Ahmadinejad? "The answer is yes," he replies, but "Not exactly our rational, but I think he is rational. [...] An attack on Iran before you are exploring all other approaches is not the right way."
Thursday, March 1, 2012
'Mowing the lawn' in Iran won't work; we must invade
Senator Reed: I presume that [a bombing campaign] would not be 100 percent effective in terms of knocking them out. It would probably delay them, but that if they're persistent enough they could at some point succeed. Is that a fair judgment from your position?General Cartwright: That's a fair judgment.Senator Reed: So that the only absolutely dispositive way to end any potential would be to physically occupy their country and to disestablish their nuclear facilities. Is that a fair, logical conclusion?General Cartwright: Absent some other unknown calculus that would go on, it's a fair conclusion.
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
CIA backs up my years-old warning on Iranian terror response
Monday, August 23, 2010
Attack-Iran propaganda from coastal liberal media
Greenwald alerts us to another Israeli plant in the U.S. media, an IDF soldier, writing in The Atlantic a supposedly objective case for Israel's unprovoked bombing of Iran.
This same journalist urged us to attack Saddam in 2002.
You folks who believe the myth of the lib'rul media are the most susceptible to this propaganda. You read something like this and think, "Well, if that liberal magazine The Atlantic believes that bombing Iran is OK, then heck, that's really saying something!"
URL: http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/08/12/goldberg
Saturday, October 3, 2009
Obama got more from Iran in 7.5 hrs. than Bush-Cheney in 8 yrs.
Obama should just quit right here because all this talking is just going to delay the war effort. Iraq -- check. Afghanistan -- check. Iran -- still negotiating?!? What the...?! Come on, we've got a schedule to keep here, people! The Middle East isn't going to democratize itself, you know!
Obama owns Bush-Cheney on Iran
October 2, 2009 JuanCole.com
Delegates of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany met with representatives of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for 7 and a half hours on Thursday for talks on Iran's nuclear research program.
Amazingly, there were signs of significant progress even on the first day, which most seasoned observers had not expected.
1. Iran agreed to allow inspectors from the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency to visit the newly announced facility near Qom within the next two months.
2. Iran agreed to meet again at the end of October.
3. Iran agreed to send "most" of its stock of low enriched uranium (3.5%) to Russia for processing to the roughly 20% degree of enrichment needed to run its small reactor producing medical isotopes. Iran has about 3200 pounds of low-enriched uranium, and is willing to send 2600 to Russia. That is a little over a ton, or about what a single Ford Focus weighs.
Thursday, July 16, 2009
U.S.-Israel deal: Palestinian state in exchange for attack on Iran?
See, Israel is perfectly capable of defending itself – and its neighbors – against Iran. Why is the U.S. getting involved?
This terms of this rumored deal between the West and Israel imply that the real impediment to a Palestinian state is Israel: It will happen whenever Israel allows it to happen. Actually, this means it will happen whenever the U.S. pressures Israel to allow it to happen. Hence, the U.S. is the real impediment to the formation of a Palestinian state: It will happen whenever we want it to happen.
I'm not so sure I buy it though. The sides in this deal could be reversed: Israel would use America's "permission" to attack Iran as a face-saving reason to back down to the Palestinians; and the U.S. would use Israel as a proxy to attack its enemy Iran. Israel is probably happy to attack Iran, too, but they wouldn't dare do so on their own without U.S. diplomatic cover in the UN Security Council.
Israeli navy in Suez Canal prepares for potential attack on Iran
By Sheera Frenkel
July 16, 2009 | The Times Online
Two Israeli missile class warships have sailed through the Suez Canal ten days after a submarine capable of launching a nuclear missile strike, in preparation for a possible attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.
The deployment into the Red Sea, confirmed by Israeli officials, was a clear signal that Israel was able to put its strike force within range of Iran at short notice. It came before long-range exercises by the Israeli air force in America later this month and the test of a missile defence shield at a US missile range in the Pacific Ocean.
Israel has strengthened ties with Arab nations who also fear a nuclear-armed Iran. In particular, relations with Egypt have grown increasingly strong this year over the "shared mutual distrust of Iran", according to one Israeli diplomat. Israeli naval vessels would likely pass through the Suez Canal for an Iranian strike.
"This is preparation that should be taken seriously. Israel is investing time in preparing itself for the complexity of an attack on Iran. These manoeuvres are a message to Iran that Israel will follow up on its threats," an Israeli defence official said.
It is believed that Israel's missile-equipped submarines, and its fleet of advanced aircraft, could be used to strike at in excess of a dozen nuclear-related targets more than 800 miles from Israel.
Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, said that his Government explicitly allowed passage of Israeli vessels, and an Israeli admiral said that the drills were "run regularly with the full co-operation of the Egyptians."
Two Israeli Saar class missile boats and a Dolphin class submarine have passed through Suez. Israel has six Dolphin-class submarines, three of which are widely believed to carry nuclear missiles.
Israel will also soon test an Arrow interceptor missile on a US missile range in the Pacific Ocean. The system is designed to defend Israel from ballistic missile attacks by Iran and Syria. Lieutenant-General Patrick O'Reilly, the director of the Pentagon's Missile Defence Agency, said that Israel would test against a target with a range of more than 630 miles (1,000km) — too long for previous Arrow test sites in the eastern Mediterranean.
The Israeli air force, meanwhile, will send F16C fighter jets to participate in exercises at Nellis Air Force base in Nevada this month. Israeli C130 Hercules transport aircraft will also compete in the Rodeo 2009 competition at McChord Air Force base in Washington.
"It is not by chance that Israel is drilling long-range manoeuvres in a public way. This is not a secret operation. This is something that has been published and which will showcase Israel's abilities," said an Israeli defence official.
He added that in the past, Israel had run a number of covert long-range drills. A year ago, Israeli jets flew over Greece in one such drill, while in May, reports surfaced that Israeli air force aircraft were staging exercises over Gibraltar. An Israeli attack on a weapons convoy in Sudan bound for militants in the Gaza Strip earlier this year was also seen as a rehearsal for hitting moving convoys.
The exercises come at a time when Western diplomats are offering support for an Israeli strike on Iran in return for Israeli concessions on the formation of a Palestinian state.
If agreed it would make an Israeli strike on Iran realistic "within the year" said one British official.
Diplomats said that Israel had offered concessions on settlement policy, Palestinian land claims and issues with neighboring Arab states, to facilitate a possible strike on Iran.
"Israel has chosen to place the Iranian threat over its settlements," said a senior European diplomat.
Sunday, July 13, 2008
Bush gives Israel 'amber light' to attack Iran
The problem for America is that, even if we don't aid the Israelis with our air bases or satellite intelligence, nobody will clear us of complicity in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran. Everybody knows that Israel won't act without Bush's go-ahead.
Even worse, as this article concludes, even if Israel does decide to "act alone," it may not be capable of wiping out all of Iran's possible nuclear sites without U.S. help. Then Bush-Cheney would be sorely tempted to step in and finish the job.
I see one possible way around this problem, and it would be a real re-making of the Mideast: a complete halt to all U.S. military aid to Israel. The first message of such a step would be: "Israel, you're on your own now." For Israel is certainly capable of defending itself without U.S. help. At the very least, it's capable of buying U.S.-made weapons on the open market at market prices. The second message of a cut-off of U.S. aid would be: "America takes no responsibility for Israel's military actions against Iran, or in the Palestinian territories." As a strong, democratic, sovereign nation, it would finally be Israel's prerogative to decide for itself issues related to its own safety. Israel would probably do some unsavory things that we wouldn't agree with, but... don't they already? For instance, when Condoleeza Rice called for temporary cessation of hostilities during U.S.-initiated Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, Olmert ignored her, terribly hurting U.S. credibility.
For sure, America couldn't disentangle itself from Israel overnight, but halting the $ billions of military aid that we send every year to Israel would be a good start. It would also bolster our credibility as an "honest broker" in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, should we choose to continue pushing for peace.
Finally, this is not to say that America couldn't or shouldn't come to Israel's aid if Israel faced an existential crisis. Indeed, America would probably come to the aid of any democratic, Western-oriented country if it faced annihilation from an aggressor.
President George W Bush Backs Israeli Plan for Strike on Iran
By Uzi Mahnaimi
July 13, 2008 | The Times Online
[Excerpts:]
'Despite the opposition of his own generals and widespread scepticism that America is ready to risk the military, political and economic consequences of an airborne strike on Iran, the president has given an "amber light" to an Israeli plan to attack Iran's main nuclear sites with long-range bombing sorties, the official told The Sunday Times.'
'"It's really all down to the Israelis," the Pentagon official added. "This administration will not attack Iran. This has already been decided. But the president is really preoccupied with the nuclear threat against Israel and I know he doesn't believe that anything but force will deter Iran."'
'Senator Barack Obama's previous opposition to the war in Iraq, and his apparent doubts about the urgency of the Iranian threat, have intensified pressure on the Israeli hawks to act before November's US presidential election. "If I were an Israeli I wouldn't wait," the Pentagon official added.'
'Yet US officials acknowledge that no American president can afford to remain idle if Israel is threatened. How genuine the Iranian threat is was the subject of intense debate last week, with some analysts arguing that Iran might have a useable nuclear weapon by next spring and others convinced that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is engaged in a dangerous game of bluffing — mainly to impress a domestic Iranian audience that is struggling with economic setbacks and beginning to question his leadership.'
'"Maybe the Israelis could start off the attack and have us finish it off," Katzman added. "And maybe that has been their intention all along. But in terms of the long-term military campaign that would be needed to permanently suppress Iran's nuclear programme, only the US is perceived as having that capability right now."'
Monday, June 23, 2008
Neocon's scary predictions on Iran attacks & U.S. election
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Kosovo, 'humanitarian hawks,' and Iraq
Matthew Yglesias
February 21, 2008 | Prospect.org
With Kosovo's formal declaration of independence from Serbia on Monday, and the United States' decision to extend recognition to the planet's newest country, the time has come for a look back on the approximately 10 years of intense U.S. involvement in that conflict. Kosovo is a tiny, seemingly worthless patch of land lacking in all natural resources, but it plays a strangely large role in our foreign-policy debates. During arguments about the Iraq War, in particular, liberal hawks had a habit of wielding the poor Kosovar Albanians as a cudgel: If you supported Bill Clinton's 1999 bombing campaign, the argument went, then surely you could support a war against Saddam Hussein.
Then and now, many pro-Kosovo, anti-Iraq liberals could persuasively (Kenneth Roth's 2004 "War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention" is my personal favorite) argue that various factors distinguish the two cases. Still, the argument was never about a strict Kosovo-implies-Iraq logic. Rather, first Bosnia and then Kosovo provided the impetus for an intellectually influential, humanitarian hawk movement aimed at advocating the use of military force to advance liberal values whose leaders, inspired by the success of Kosovo, saw Iraq as potentially continuing the momentum built up in the Balkans.
Today, there are few left-of-center defenders of the Iraq War as it actually exists, but there continues to be considerable concern about an "Iraq Syndrome" overreaction to the chaos that has followed the invasion. Kosovo, in this scheme, is supposed to be the "good war" that serves as a reminder of the positive potential of military force. Thus, even as center-left figures agree that the unilateralism of the Bush era must come to an end, there's a desperate search to find some new mechanism -- perhaps a Global NATO or perhaps a Concert of Democracies -- that could authorize a war that, like Kosovo, is fought neither in self-defense nor in defense of an ally nor with the approval of the U.N. Security Council.
In that light, it's worth taking full measure of how modest our accomplishments in Kosovo have been. The declaration of independence marks not the fulfillment of NATO's objectives in Kosovo, but something more like NATO accepting the fact that those objectives will not be achieved. Rather than a rights-respecting democratic government for an autonomous province, we have a ramshackle state dependent on external support dominated by a sectarian party and where the country's Serb minority rejects the legitimacy of the government and refuses to acknowledge the country's newfound independence. Our successful effort to halt and then reverse the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians was merely followed by a substantial counter-cleansing of Serbs. Human Rights Watch's memorandum on the occasion of Kosovo independence is a bleak reminder of what success has looked like:
Now that Kosovo is formally separate from Serbia, it seems overwhelmingly likely that protecting the rights of the country's geographically concentrated Serb minority will either require the indefinite presence of international troops or else a further round of secession in which Serb sections of Kosovo are carved out and allowed to re-integrate with Serbia. This still looks defensible compared to the alternative course of action of standing aside and letting Milosevic have his way with the province. But many hawks looked at Kosovo and saw not a boundary case for when the use of force might be legitimate, but a new baseline against which future interventions should be judged. If you were willing to use force against Milosevic, the thinking went, then why not Saddam? Why not Sudan? This line of thinking came to a bad end in Mesopotamia, but many harken back to the Balkans to try to make the case that Iraq should be considered an exception and not something that casts aspersions on the utility of unconstrained American power. In reality, Kosovo, though much less disastrous than Iraq, has, like Iraq, turned out to be more problematic than enthusiasts advertised and should, like Iraq, mostly inspire humility about what we can expect to achieve through force.
The truth, though disappointing from the point of view of journalism, is that the most promising humanitarian elements of foreign policy tend to be the boring ones. Timely and effective diplomacy can often avert humanitarian catastrophes before they break out at much lower cost than coercive force can end them once they've started. And the U.N.'s traditional peacekeeping operations, where parties to a conflict request third-party troops to help monitor and enforce a peace deal, have a solid track record of success but are perennially under-resourced by an indifferent United States. Greater commitment -- political, financial, and (when appropriate) military -- to these kinds of operations would bring much larger humanitarian benefits than would any hypothetic humanitarian wars.
Nevertheless, the debate in the United States remains oddly dominated by the specter of unilateral military coercion as a potential tool of humanitarianism, as if the only viable alternative to a callous indifference to the fate of foreigners is to have the Pentagon identify some "bad" foreigners and kill them. One doesn't need to regret the 1999 military operation itself to regret the ways in which hubristic overestimates of what's been achieved in the Balkans have fed into this mentality.
Monday, January 28, 2008
FOX/Heritage: Neocons' post-Bush agenda
- Even more Pentagon spending, although we now spend as much on our army than the rest of the world combined;
- More offensive, preventive U.S. strikes (here re-branded as "damage-limitation strategy"), even if America is not threatened;
- Permanent war against Islamic radicals (as the new Cold War), no matter where or how weak that Islamic minority may be; and
- The U.S. guaranteeing, by means of military force, Western access to trade routes and natural resources (read: oil & gas).
None of the above is actually necessary, as Mr. Spring falsely concludes, "to protect the American people and their families." Rather, even more massive investment in America's Military-Industrial complex would shore up America's slipping hegemonic - "hyperpower" status, and (hopefully) give the U.S. outweighed international influence as its economic power declines relative to Asia, the EU, and Mideast's.
The neocons don't know much about economics. They are not even pro-globalization in the Tom Friedman sense. Rather, they have an outdated 19th century, zero-sum view of the world where guns and guts get the gold. All they know how to do is spend money on more and bigger weapons, recklessly pull the trigger, and hope that this will guarantee America's future.
But they are nutty, they are wrong, and they will bankrupt our treasury and our moral credibility if we let them.
Heritage Foundation: Laying the Groundwork for a Military Victory
By Baker Spring
January 25, 2008 | FoxNews
George W. Bush is in the last year of his presidency. Yet the greater war against terrorism will continue long after he's out of office.
So, as he prepares to deliver his final State of the Union address, he needs to address the requirements for national defense beyond Iraq.
This isn't to say he shouldn't mention Iraq. Our progress there in the last year remains a vital issue, and the American people deserve to hear about it. What President Bush must do, though, is tie his explanation of the progress in Iraq to the broader requirements for military preparedness.
First, Bush must remind us this isn't the time for a "peace dividend." Even if the U.S. achieves a swift military and political victory in Iraq, one that would allow tens of thousands of Americans to leave Iraq, the broader war will continue.
Our country can't afford to hollow out the military when we need it to win the war against Islamic extremists.
Unfortunately, we're still rebuilding from the "procurement holiday" forced on the military in the 1990s. Because we didn't purchase enough weapons systems during that decade, we're forced to spend more today to buy the equipment the military needs. [Like armored Humvees? -- J]
This increase must allow the military to recover from the shortfall and put it on the path to sustained investments for new weapons and equipment.
That leaves less available for buying current weapons systems. For example, the Navy has been forced to reduce construction of Virginia-class submarines to one per year — even though constructing two per year could have reduced the unit cost to $2 billion per boat.
The Air Force has been forced to scale back dramatically its purchasing of F-22 Raptor tactical fighters. It's slated to obtain just 183 F-22s despite its requirement for 381.
The Army has been forced to extend the production time for its Future Combat System by five years.
This president ought to leave a very different military to his successor than Bill Clinton left for him. That, of course, will cost money.
For example, it will cost $8 billion more than is currently planned per year for the Navy to buy the new ships it needs and $3 billion per year for the Marine Corps to recruit and train thousands of necessary new warriors.
How much will the total bill be? Well, military analysts at the American Legion suggest it would take a sustained investment of 5 percent of GDP each year. Experts at The Heritage Foundation think it can be done for 4 percent — slightly more than the 3.9 percent appropriated this year.
Bush should make it clear that our military spending is low compared to what it's been other times we've been at war. And he should point out that we need to invest today to have the military we'll require in the years ahead.
The president also needs to articulate a sound national security strategy. It ought to be called a "damage limitation" program. This would explain how he intends to protect the American people (as well as friends and allies around the world) from attack.
[Take note: They're saying it's America's responsibility to protect its friends and allies from attack. Boy, these neocons talk out of both sides of their mouths! On the one side, they half-heartedly complain that Europe and Asia don't spend enough on their own defense. But on the other, they admit they want our friends to be dependent on American power, since this guarantees America's influence. - J]
Such a pro-active stance would be a welcome change from our Cold War policy of accepting vulnerability by relying on a strategy of retaliation (mutually assured destruction) in case of attack.
A damage-limitation strategy would be designed to minimize the likelihood of a successful weapons of mass destruction attack on the U.S. and its friends and allies. After all, other nations are less likely to attempt to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons — or attempt to use these weapons — if their attack is likely to fail.
Meanwhile, our military needs to field the correct mix of offensive and defensive forces. We must maintain the conventional forces necessary to go after Islamic extremists anywhere in the world, which is an essential component of the damage-limitation strategy's central goal of providing protection to the American people and allies.
America's general purpose forces, however, cannot focus on the threat of Islamic extremists alone. There are two other broad requirements of the damage-limitation strategy that can be met only through modernized general purposes forces possessing broader capabilities.
The first is to prevent a major power threat to Europe, eastern Asia or the Persian Gulf. This requires enough conventional military power to counter the organized armed forces of aggressive countries.
The second requirement is to maintain access to vital resources and conduits for global trade. In this case, U.S. general purpose forces must be capable of projecting power to distant regions in order to defend access to those resources.
America's military must also be capable of protecting vital trade routes, whether at sea, in the air, in space or in cyberspace.
Our recent focus on Iraq is understandable. But it's time to broaden the nation's perspective regarding national defense. That's where the State of the Union speech comes in.
Iraq is a critical battle in a long war, just as Korea and Vietnam were important battles in the Cold War. Sustained investments in the military are urgent and necessary to achieve ultimate victory.
Most importantly, President Bush should use the speech to make a solemn pledge to the American people that the military investments he is advocating are necessary to protect them and their families.