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Wednesday, July 30, 2014
U.S. offers up 'war reserves' to rearm Israel's killing machine
Wednesday, March 5, 2014
UN envoy in Crimea threatened, trapped, forced to leave
P.S. -- I don't mean to cast aspersions on all Crimeans. Several hundred thousand Crimeans are fully supportive of the Maidan movement and the new government, in the hope that it will stamp out corruption and listen to the will of the people. I know many of them personally. The actions of a few deluded provocateurs (and most likely, Russian-paid stooges) should not be taken as an expression of popular sentiment in Crimea.
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
Lib'rul media hawks squawk for war with Syria
Wednesday, December 5, 2012
Chomsky: What's really happening in Gaza
Tuesday, October 30, 2012
Republicans harass, threaten OSCE election monitors
Thursday, August 23, 2012
Texas judge preparing for post-Obama uprising
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| Stop teasing us and just do it. Please! |
Wednesday, September 14, 2011
Palestinine's statehood bid in UN will show true stripes
Friday, September 9, 2011
UN economic report: 'We need to reverse course quickly'
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Iraq's gov't won't sign U.S. occupation treaty
Iraq Asks U.S. to Reopen Talks Over Security Pact Changes
October 28, 2008 | Associated Press
Iraq's government decided Tuesday to formally ask the United States to reopen negotiations on a proposed deal to keep American troops here past the end of the year. The U.S. suggested it may not be ready to offer more concessions.
That cast doubt on whether the agreement can win parliamentary approval by the end of 2008, when the U.N. mandate expires — and with it the legal basis for the U.S. military to operate in Iraq.
The U.S. has warned that without an agreement or an extension of the mandate, military operations would cease, including not only combat operations but also infrastructure projects and aid to Iraq's government.
Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said the decision to ask for more talks was taken after Cabinet members submitted amendments to the draft. They asked Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to present them to the Iraqi negotiating team.
Al-Dabbagh described the amendments as "essential" before the prime minister can submit the draft to parliament. Al-Maliki has said he won't submit the document to the 275-member legislature unless he is confident it can win overwhelming approval.
In Washington, White House press secretary Dana Perino said the Bush administration may talk to the Iraqis about their proposed amendments, but that "it will just be a very high bar for them to clear for us to change anything" in the agreement.
She said that U.S. officials have not seen the amendments list.
"It might be something we can work with, it might not," Perino said. "We have provided them with our best thinking on it, our best offer. We think that the door is pretty much shut on these negotiations."
For nearly two weeks, Iraqi politicians have been considering the draft agreement, which would keep U.S. troops in Iraq through 2011 unless both sides agree that they could stay.
The draft would also give the Iraqis a greater role in supervising U.S. military operations and allow Iraqi courts to try U.S. soldiers and contractors accused of major crimes off duty and off base.
But critics say the draft does not go far enough in protecting Iraqi sovereignty, and major Shiite politicians said last week that the agreement stands little chance of approval in its current form.
One option being floated privately is to ask the U.N. Security Council to renew the mandate for six months or a year until a way out of the deadlock is found. It is unclear whether Russia, China and other council members may raise their own demands and delay the process.
An official at al-Maliki's office said some of the amendments submitted in Tuesday's Cabinet meetings had been forwarded to U.S. diplomats in Baghdad. The official said the changes were mostly attempts to clarify parts of the text that the Cabinet found open to interpretation.
He said the changes were introduced in both the English and Arabic texts of the agreement. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not supposed to talk about the discussions.
Neither the official or al-Dabbagh elaborated on the changes. Some Iraqi politicians have complained that the parts dealing with Iraqi jurisdiction were unclear.
They also wanted clarification of the conditions under which U.S. troops might be asked to stay after Dec. 31, 2011.
The agreement, reached after months of tough negotiations, has stirred a political storm in Iraq, with most of the major political groups reluctant to take a clear position for or against the deal.
Only the radical group led by anti-American Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has taken a public stand on the agreement. The group, which holds 30 seats in parliament, has rejected it outright.
Al-Maliki has not publicly committed himself to the current draft. [Whoa, that's something! Al-Maliki is supposed to be our guy in Iraq. -- J]
Iraqi leaders have objected to what they describe as unjustified threats by senior American officials about what would happen if the year ends without an agreement or a new mandate.
"I don't think there are any Iraqis who think that they are ready to do this on their own, deep down," Perino said. "Iraq still has a lot of violence that they have to deal with. Our soldiers are the ones who are there to help them deal with it. And they're going to need our help for some time."
In violence Tuesday, four police officers were killed in a drive-by shooting in the turbulent northern city of Mosul, while three civilians were killed and 13 others wounded in a Baghdad car bombing, police said.
Also in the capital, another nine people, including four policemen, were wounded in two separate roadside bombs targeting police convoys.
Thursday, August 28, 2008
Letter to Kyiv Post: Ukraine-NATO
In response to your paper's monolithic "pro" stance for Ukraine's NATO entry, which you say is required immediately because of Russia's overly aggressive response in Georgia, let me offer a different view.
First, let's remember: Ukraine is not Georgia. The two countries' fates are not necessarily intertwined -- not unless President Yushchenko chooses to meddle in the Russia-Georgia conflict, at Ukraine's peril. Let's hope Yushchenko knows the difference between expressing words of solidarity, and committing national suicide.
As an American, and a patriot, my first concern is whether Ukraine's admission into NATO is in America's interest. The answer is: No. NATO and the U.S. would gain little from Ukraine. As the Kyiv Post noted, Ukraine's conscript army is small, outdated, with terrible morale; and Ukraine cannot afford to fund its NATO commitments. Ukraine has offered radar listening stations to NATO, but they are not of much defensive value. With all of their current satellites and listening stations, America and NATO can already see and hear what is happening in Russia. These stations are not about defense, they are about reducing Russia's nuclear first-strike capability. This means eliminating the principal of mutually assured destruction (MAD), the terrible yet terribly effective foundation for nuclear peace for the past 40 years. After attacking Iraq and Iran, this is U.S. neocons' greatest mad dream. Naturally, this worries Russia, as it should worry any unbiased observer. Renewing a nuclear arms race with Russia is not in America's, or the world's, interest. Unfortunately, the fate of the world still depends on MAD.
More importantly to your readers, NATO expansion is not in Ukraine's interest. Ukraine could gain some side advantages, yes, like some international prestige and perhaps eventual EU membership. But overall, Ukraine is more likely to suffer badly as a result.
A majority of the Ukrainian parliament and population opposes Ukraine's membership in NATO. Moreover, the emotional intensity of the anti-NATO majority far exceeds the pro-NATO minority's, as violent anti-NATO demonstrations in Ukraine have recently shown. If Ukraine is a real democracy, public opinion -- especially on such an important question -- cannot be defied by one man or his cabal. Most Ukrainians recognize that Russia is very, very close, and America is very far away, and all the rational implications.
Russia is Ukraine's #1 trading partner; and it provides most of Ukraine's oil and natural gas. NATO can't change that. NATO membership would leave Ukraine just as vulnerable to all kinds of Russian meddling, not the least of which would be turning off Ukraine's gas supply in the middle of winter. NATO can't stop Russia from actively fomenting separatism in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, openly and in secret. NATO can't stop Russia from cracking down on the millions of legal and illegal Ukrainians living in Russia; and NATO can't stop Russia from refusing entry to the millions more who travel to Russia each year on business or to visit family. NATO can't stop Russia from imposing crippling tariffs on Ukrainian imports, or dreaming up pretexts to declare Ukrainian products "unsafe" for consumption. Russia can afford to do all this, and take some losses, because it is swimming in Western cash from oil and gas profits. Ukraine does not enjoy the same luxury. In summary, NATO can guarantee only helplessness in the face of Russia's escalation of non-military interference in Ukraine's affairs.
But what about Crimea, your readers ask? (Let's leave that contentious sandbar Tuzla aside for now.) Again, as a U.S. patriot, I have to question seriously the wisdom of admitting into my defensive alliance a militarily weak country with a potentially dangerous territorial dispute with a nuclear behemoth. (And that goes doubly -- no, squared -- for Georgia!) Yet as a grateful guest of Ukraine who greatly values Ukraine's independence, I must ask myself: Is there an alternative to NATO? An answer that precludes putting Ukraine in the middle of a tug-of-war between Great Powers? There is. The U.S. should exert its diplomatic muscle, gather its allies, and issue a clear and unequivocal statement along these lines:
The free world has no interest in controlling Ukraine, a sovereign and independent country, or in occupying its territory with foreign military personnel against Ukraine's wishes. The free world does have an interest in preserving Ukraine's freedom and territorial integrity along its current borders. The free world will not tolerate any diminution of Ukraine.
The U.S. could even say this in a UN Security Council Resolution. If Russia vetoed such a resolution, it would have a lot of awkward explaining to do, and risk international pariah status. (Russia's expulsion from the G-8 would be a good first response). Let America (and Ukraine) first take more moderate steps to preserve the status quo, without seeking to give one side an advantage in Ukraine that could upset the balance of peace, or move America and Russia toward a nuclear hair-trigger.
Finally, NATO or no NATO, we in the West should have enough gumption, and faith in our values and principles to say, publicly and privately, that we will not tolerate the worst-case scenario: Russia's full or partial annexation of Ukraine. Let me offer some perspective... Like Ukraine, Finland is a free and democratic European country which cooperates with NATO, but is not a NATO member. Russia has invaded both countries in the past. Yet nobody doubts that American and the West would fight a Russian attack on Finland, NATO or no NATO. The same tacit, universal understanding must exist regarding Ukraine's inviolability: Never again; not here.
Sunday, November 25, 2007
Bush backtracks on political goals in Iraq
We've gone from Bush's Criteria -- an Iraq that can sustain, defend, and govern itself, be an ally in the war on terror, and serve as an example of freedom to the Mideast -- to a bunch of symbolic steps that recalcitrant Iraqis would have taken anyway.
Whatever. If this sets the stage for U.S. withdrawal, so be it. Let's declare "victory" any way we can and get the hell out of there!
With American military successes outpacing political gains in Iraq, the Bush administration has lowered its expectation of quickly achieving major steps toward unifying the country, including passage of a long-stymied plan to share oil revenues and holding regional elections.
Instead, administration officials say they are focusing their immediate efforts on several more limited but achievable goals in the hope of convincing Iraqis, foreign governments and Americans that progress is being made toward the political breakthroughs that the military campaign of the past 10 months was supposed to promote.
The short-term American targets include passage of a $48 billion Iraqi budget, something the Iraqis say they are on their way to doing anyway; renewing the United Nations mandate that authorizes an American presence in the country, which the Iraqis have done repeatedly before; and passing legislation to allow thousands of Baath Party members from Saddam Hussein's era to rejoin the government. A senior Bush administration official described that goal as largely symbolic since re-hirings have been quietly taking place already.
Bush administration officials have not abandoned their larger goals and still emphasize the vital importance of reaching them eventually. They say that even modest steps, if taken soon, could set the stage for more progress, in the same manner that this year's so-called surge of troops opened the way, unexpectedly, for the realignment of Sunni tribesmen to the American side.
A senior official said the administration was intensifying its pressure on the Iraqi government to produce some concrete signs of political progress.
"If we can show progress outside of the security sector alone, that will go a long way to demonstrate that we are in fact on a sustainable path to stability in Iraq," the senior official said, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the administration's planning.
On Saturday, Ryan Crocker, the American ambassador to Baghdad, said the military had created an opportunity for progress, but warned, "This is going to be a long, hard slog."
"It is going to be one thing at a time, maybe two things at a time, we hope with increasing momentum," he said. "It is a long-term process."
The White House has clearly been elated by the decline in violence that followed the increase in American forces, now totaling 162,000 troops. Public comments by President George W. Bush and his aides, however, have been muted, reflecting a frustration at the lack of political progress, a continuation of a pattern in which intense American efforts to promote broader reconciliation have proved largely fruitless.
There have been some signs that American influence over Iraqi politics is dwindling, not growing, after the recent improvements in security — which remain incomplete, as shown by a deadly bombing on Friday in Baghdad. While Bush administration officials once said they aimed to secure "reconciliation" among Iraq's deeply divided religious, ethnic and sectarian groups, some officials now refer to their goal as "accommodation."
"We can't pass their legislation," a senior American official in Baghdad said. "We can't make them like each other. We can't even make them talk to each other. Well, sometimes we can. But we can help them execute their budget."
Ambassador Crocker drew a distinction between the effectiveness of the American military buildup in quelling violence and the influence the United States could bring to bear at a political level, where the Iraqis must play the decisive role.
"The political stuff does not lend itself to sending out a couple of battalions to help the Iraqi's pass legislation," he said.
Officials in Washington and in Baghdad share the view that military gains alone are not enough to overcome the deep distrust among Iraqi factions caused by nearly five decades of dictatorship and war. And in both capitals there are leaders who continue to hold out hope for broad political gains, eventually.
"We need a grand bargain among all the groups," said one senior member of Iraq's government, speaking on the condition of anonymity.
But with that not yet in sight, Bush administration officials said that they hoped that securing approval of a few initial steps might lead to more substantive agreements next year, including provincial elections, which the White House wants to see held before Bush leaves office less than 14 months from now. The prospect of such elections has been politically delicate because of the fear that some regions, like Shiite-dominated southern Iraq, are most likely to vote for leaders who support stronger regional governments at the expense of the Baghdad administration.
While one Bush administration official called the renewed pressure on Baghdad a "political surge" after the increase in troop levels this year, most of what Washington is seeking appears to reflect a diminished and more realistic set of expectations after months of little political progress.
The troop increase at the beginning of the year was intended to create the conditions for an improvement in Iraq's political stability measured by so-called benchmarks, including a broad agreement on sharing oil revenues.
But those benchmarks remain largely unfulfilled despite a significant drop in attacks recorded by the American military from a peak in June. The administration's critics in Congress have cited the lack of progress toward those benchmarks as evidence that the White House is on the wrong track in Iraq and ought to begin a rapid drawdown of American combat forces.
Perhaps the most achievable of the administration's short-term targets, American and Iraqi officials said, is legislation that would allow thousands of members of the Saddam-era Baath Party, most of them Sunnis, to return to government positions. A senior administration official described that legislation as largely symbolic — since the Shiite-dominated government had begun to accommodate some Sunni officials in practice — but important in that it would at last signal some progress, capitalizing on the relative lull in violence.
Other immediate steps the Bush administration is pressing the Iraqi government to take include passing a budget, $48 billion for the coming year, and again renewing the United Nations mandate for the American troop presence before it expires at the end of the year.
In Baghdad, Iraqi officials indicated that the various parties, which like much of the country are defined largely by sect or ethnicity, remained far apart on the more difficult issues of sharing power and revenues. Some seemed surprised by the idea that the Bush administration would apply more pressure.
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki's political adviser, Sadiq al-Rikabi, said that it would not take any pressure from the Americans to persuade the Iraqi leaders and Parliament to approve a budget. "Every state needs a budget," he said. "It's impossible to function without a budget. It does not need any push from anyone."
At the same time, though, he expressed an appreciation for the Bush administration's effort to keep all sides talking.
Although the White House no longer faces the immediate prospect of losing crucial political support for the war effort in Iraq — because the war's opponents lack the necessary votes in Congress to force a change in policy — the imperative for political progress remains, if only because of the American elections in less than a year.
Despite the reduction in violence, with attacks now down to levels last seen in early 2006, some Democrats in Congress have continued to press for a timeline for a withdrawal. Most recently, the House tried to tie a deadline to a $50 billion war spending bill, although that proposal died in the Senate.
When Congress debated the war earlier this year, the administration pushed hard for the Iraqis to approve some of the same pieces of legislation that have yet to materialize. Several times, for example, the law on dispensing oil revenues, which are now surging because of world oil prices nearing $100 a barrel, appeared on the brink of adoption, only to stall.
One of the immediate American concerns is getting Iraq to request an extended United Nations mandate, which authorizes the American-led military presence. In Baghdad, a senior Iraqi government official said that the extension of the mandate for the American-led multinational forces would not be a problem, but that there was little progress in negotiating the longer-term agreements on a "strategic partnership" between the United States and Iraq.
"It's the status of forces agreement that we have to start on," the official said. That agreement, although not an issue until 2009 or later, is a far more delicate matter because it will frame the future military relationship between the countries.
The most important thing the Americans can do is keep the political blocs in Iraq — Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurds — talking to each other and to help them understand legislation now being debated, several Iraqi politicians said. Only with concrete information, they said, could rumors be dispelled that specific legislation might help or hurt certain groups.
"So far the activities of the American Embassy are a bit limited in this regard," said Qassim Daoud, an independent Shiite in Parliament, who served as a minister for security in the government of Ayad Allawi before Iraq regain its own sovereignty.
Earlier this month, the White House dispatched several senior aides to Baghdad to work with the Iraqis on specific legislative areas. They include the under secretary of state for economic, energy and agricultural affairs, Reuben Jeffery III, who is working on the budget and oil law; the State Department's senior Iraq adviser, David Satterfield, who is focused on the elections and de-Baathification law; and Brett McGurk, the National Security Council's Iraq director, who is pressing for the United Nations mandate and a longer security agreement. All have been meeting with a variety of officials and party leaders across Iraq, a senior administration official said.
American officials in Baghdad appear to understand the limitations they face and are focusing on pragmatic goals like helping the Iraqi government spend the money in its budget. That, officials in both countries said, could do more than anything else to ease tensions and build support for the national government.
"I think reconciliation will eventually come," a senior Bush administration official said, but adding, "That's a long way down the path."
Monday, November 5, 2007
Interview with John 'Yosemite Sam' Bolton

This Human Events interview with ex-Amb. John Bolton is interesting and valuable to read if only because his candid statements are about as close as you'll come to exploring the dark and twisted corridors of Dick Cheney's brain. Below I've pasted some excerpts which I find particularly worthy of note.
November 5, 2007 | Human Events
HE: Why aren't we doing more [about Iran meddling in Iraq]? I sat in general Gen. Vines'office in Baghdad two Decembers ago and got an extensive briefing on the EFPs (explosively-formed penetrators) being manufactured in Iran, sent into Iraq to kill American troops. And when I asked some senior Defense Department officials about that I didn't get a straight answer. I came away with the impression that they were under instructions from the president to not do anything about it. What's going on?
JB: Well I think if you look at statements from our commanders in Iraq over the past six months, it is a cry for help against the Iranian role inside Iraq. And I worry that the reason we're not being more aggressive in defending ourselves inside Iraq is that it would disrupt the EU Three negotiations over the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Why has the administration been unwilling to talk about the Israeli raid on September the 6th? Many people believe that it's because if the full truth came out, the Six Party talks would go into the tank. That's not a legitimate reason to keep the Iranian presence in Iraq, or the North Korean presence in Syria from the American people. And I think it's a real risk for Republicans especially, that if there are reasons why this information is being withheld, it will come back to haunt them later.
[In other words, Bush's Iraq policy is hurting his Iran policy. Doggoneit, why can't we have, like, a win-win? Shoot! Heck!
Idiotically, these neocons can't make the logical connection that orderly withdraw from Iraq would strengthen our position vis-a-vis Iran, and perhaps even "gift" Tehran a whole new host of preoccupying problems trying to manage its relationships with its chaotic neighbor. But Iraq is not about geostrategy anymore -- it's about saving Republican face, and saving the blessed option of pre-emptive war for future use by neocon Administrations. - J ]
[...]
JB: Well I would say, and I say this in the book, that there is really only one reform we really need [in the UN] and that is to move from assessed to voluntary contributions. If we could move our money around to wherever we wanted, I tell you reform would go just like that. (Snaps fingers) It would be a wonder to behold.
HE: What's the odds of actually setting up an alternative to the UN?
JB: I think it's very difficult. I know a number of people have proposed it but what you would need, a United Democratic Nations for example, you'd need the Europeans to join.
HE: And they ain't going to give up their playground.
JB: They like the UN the way it is. I think I try and show in the book, what many Americans find counter-intuitive, that a big part of the problem is not the Third World, it's the Europeans, who are cloning in some respect, the European Union in the UN system. Dealing with the Third World countries is easier in some respects, because you can put it right on the table, and sometimes you can make a deal with them.
[I.e. you can usually buy off or intimidate Third World countries, but it's much harder to do that with industrialized European democracies. What Bolton wants is a UN that represents only American interests. Such an "ideal" UN would, however, for obvious reasons, be useful to nobody but America, and would be a perfect farce of an institution. - J ]
[...]
JB: Russia -- I wouldn't give up on Russia. I think they have legitimate security concerns from Islamic fundamentalism, not only on their border but in their country. Putin has gone in the wrong direction, in many respects I think we've lost opportunities with Putin that we had in the early days of the administration that we don't have now.
HE: Can you elaborate a little on that?
JB: Well Putin acquiesced in our getting out of the ABM Treaty, he acquiesced in the Treaty of Moscow, which is the perfect arms control treaty -- it's three pages long, and it lasts for ten years and it's effective for one day. He allowed former Warsaw Pact members to join NATO. Now he criticizes us for all of this for his own domestic political purposes, but in part he can say "I can see the way the world is now and if the US wants this, fine, we'll go along with it."
[ Bolton's hubris is a perfect illustration of what's been wrong with U.S. policy toward Russia since President Clinton. Bolton can't fathom (or else admit) that Russia has real national interests other than combating Islamic terrorism. U.S. policy toward Russia since 1991 has basically been to rely on Russia's seeing "the way the world is now," i.e. seeing that American interests are real and paramount, whereas weakling Russia's interests are secondary and disposable. Oil at $100 a barrel is just one way a newly confident Russia can in fact remind America that Russian interests are not of secondary importance. - J ]
Saturday, October 20, 2007
Top Iraq diplomat slams U.S., Iraq governments
WASHINGTON - A principal architect of Iraq's interim constitution, who resigned in August as one of the country's top diplomats, has laid out a devastating critique of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the U.S. occupation, telling NBC News that, functionally, "there is no Iraqi government."
The diplomat, Feisal Amin Istrabadi, said in his first interview since stepping down as Iraq's deputy ambassador to the United Nations that "this government has got to go."
When he resigned, Istrabadi, a U.S.-born lawyer who lobbied for the U.S. invasion and was the principal legal drafter of Iraq's interim constitution, said he was leaving because it was time for fresh ideas after having served three years at the United Nations.
But Istrabadi made it clear in an exclusive interview with NBC News that he was dismayed by al-Maliki's government and the U.S. occupation, saying the government was stocked with incompetent administrators who had helped bring about "chaos and instability."
The Iraqi government is an illusion, said Istrabadi, who is now a visiting professor at the Indiana University Law School. "You've got patently incompetent men appointed to important positions."
Many government departments were apportioned to religious parties for political reasons, Istrabadi said, citing the Health Ministry, which he said was dominated by the Mahdi Army militia loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, a radical anti-U.S. cleric.
"You cannot have this sectarian doling out of the Cabinet ministries," Istrabadi said. "You've got to bring in competent technocrats to try to run those ministries, the service ministries."
U.S. political imperatives to blame
Istrabadi traced what he called the country's "chaos and instability" in part to the U.S. insistence on holding elections in 2005, before Iraq had developed robust democratic institutions to buffer the influence of religious leaders.
"Both the Shia and the Sunnis were told if they didn't vote for their respective parties, that would be a violation of their religious duties," Istrabadi said.
The result was a government dominated by Shiite Islamist parties and a constitution rejected by Sunni ethnic groups. Shiite Islamist parties have blamed the Sunnis for refusing to engage in the political process.
"I think the question was: 'Should elections have been held?' And I think that there is only one answer to that question, and that's absolutely not," Istrabadi said.
Istrabadi blamed the Bush administration for pushing for the elections at least two years before Iraq was ready for them.
"What did we accomplish, exactly, [with] this push towards an appearance of institutions ... merely an appearance?" he asked.
"Except that an American politician can stand up and say, 'Look what we accomplished in Iraq.' When, in fact, what we accomplished in Iraq over the last three years has been chaos and instability."
Free to speak out
Istrabadi acknowledged that he harbored those doubts at the time but was powerless to speak out because he represented the government. "I publicly defended them because that was the government's policy," he said.
Free of that burden now, Istrabadi was eager to speak out.
Istrabadi said there were probably few politicians in Iraq who could still build enough support to replace al-Maliki, whose government has been marked by instability and frequent discussions about a possible Cabinet reshuffling. But he lamented that the situation was so chaotic that they probably would not want the job.
"Fundamentally, you have the Iraq state falling apart and an inability on the part of the political class to put it back together," he said.
He also had harsh words for the United States' protection of private contracting firms. A U.S.-Iraqi panel is reviewing the use of private security companies after 17 people were killed when guards employed by Blackwater USA opened fire on civilians Sept. 16 in Baghdad.
Contractors are immune from Iraqi prosecution under a decree issued in June 2004 by Paul Bremer, then the U.S. administrator of Iraq.
Istrabadi said the Iraqi government had pushed for three years for a "Status of Forces Agreement," which would outline U.S. and Iraqi rights with regard to armed combatants, to no avail.
"What right does Paul Bremer have to exempt entities from the application of Iraqi law?" Istrabadi asked. "He created a lawless class in Iraq."
A man of two countries
Istrabadi, 45, a stocky man with the persuasive style of an accomplished lawyer, was born in the United States to Iraqi parents — his father was a Shiite and his mother a Sunni — in exile. As a young child, initially he returned with his parents to Iraq, and he holds both U.S. and Iraq citizenship.
He witnessed Saddam Hussein's rise to power, watching on television as 13 people were hanged.
When Saddam's Baath Party consolidated control in 1970, his family fled to the United States again, and he would spend the next 33 of his life as an exile in America.
Istrabadi became active in Iraqi opposition circles beginning in 1996, and he pushed eagerly for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Even now, he is unwilling to call the invasion a mistake.
But he is glum over the prospects for his native country, and he is frustrated by what he found there.
"If I could say that the government, U.S. policy, was headed in a positive way in Iraq — so that I could see a light at the end of the tunnel — it would have been harder to walk away," he said.
Sunday, March 18, 2007
The UN: Made in the USA
Most of this book review is devoted to analyzing the unspectacular rise and fall of Kofi Annan, describing just how sincerely pro-American he was.
But for all you UN bashers, these final paragraphs are required reading. The UN has always been a tool of US power. That's why the right's criticism of it is so laughable… and so disingenuous.
Book Review | March 15, 2007
Made in USA
TheNation.com
by Perry Anderson
[…]
The [UN] organization was from its inception an American creation, as Stephen Schlesinger has shown in abundant and admiring detail, the product of Roosevelt's vision of a postwar world in which the USSR and Britain would retain delimited spheres of influence within an international order whose overarching power would be the United States. Its founding conference at San Francisco was meticulously controlled and choreographed by Washington, with a special unit of US military intelligence in the Presidio intercepting all cables to and from the assembled delegates, the FBI tracking their movements on the ground and a large bloc of Latin American satellites assuring majorities when issues were put to the vote. Soviet compliance was purchased with promises of noninterference in Eastern Europe and a watered-down right of veto in the Security Council. With its headquarters planted in New York, where surveillance would be permanent, and a large majority of members--principally European and Latin American--at the beck and call of Washington, the UN, whose first Secretary General, Trygve Lie, even illegally collaborated with the FBI in purging his own staff, was an all-but-infallible decoration of the American will. For more than twenty years, the United States never had to cast a single veto in the Security Council, so relentlessly did its resolutions coincide with whatever Washington wanted. The landmarks of the UN in this period were approval of the creation of Israel (the Jewish third of the population was allocated more than half the territory of Mandate Palestine by Ralphe Bunche, the "ghost-writing harlot," as he described himself, of the UN plan for partition, which was rammed through the General Assembly by the United States with every bribe and blackmail at its disposal); provision of a flag of convenience for American intervention in the Korean civil war, checked short of complete victory only by Chinese entry into the conflict; and induction of Mobutu Sese Seko's dictatorship in the Congo, after Hammarskjöld and his American advisers had connived at the murder of Patrice Lumumba.
Decolonization, multiplying new member states from the Third World, brought such unimpeded utilization of the UN by the United States to an end. The General Assembly resolution of December 1960, calling for independence of the colonies--the United States, in the company of Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and South Africa, refused to vote for it--marked the dusk of European imperialism. In the Middle East, Israel's pre-emptive war of 1967, on the pretext of Cairo's request that UN forces, ensconced in Egypt ever since it was victim of the three-way attack by Britain, France and Israel in 1956, finally exit the country--naturally there were none on the Israeli side of the border; why should the aggressor put up with any?--was a turning point for Arab opinion . In Southeast Asia the Tet offensive of 1968 emboldened opposition to American power across the Third World, and a group of seventy-seven ex-colonial countries started for the first time to offer organized resistance in the UN. The belated seating of the People's Republic of China in 1971, to Washington's fury--this was before Nixon's visit to Beijing--amid scenes of wild rejoicing in the chamber, made it clear that the General Assembly had escaped American control.
The first US veto had been cast shortly before, in defense of Ian Smith's racist regime in Rhodesia. Since then, in a complete reversal of the pattern of the previous period, the United States has vetoed more than eighty resolutions in the UN, many of them critical of Israel, others of South Africa, and not a few of its own actions in Nicaragua and elsewhere--products of the conjunction between the Soviet bloc and Third World in the 1970s and '80s. The acute dislike of the UN on the American right, lingering to this day, dates from these years. Unlike the first phase of UN history, however, this second phase was for all practical purposes an exercise in futility. There was no risk of the United States suffering an Israel, Korea or Congo in reverse. Washington was not going to be ambushed, as Moscow had been more than once, in a structure it had itself designed. The United States remained master of what the UN could do, however many impotent resolutions were passed in the General Assembly or proposed to the Security Council and then killed by it. No UN decisions of any significance mark these decades. In the resultant limbo, symbolic gestures like the denunciation of Zionism as a form of racism made do instead.
This period came to an abrupt end in 1990, with the disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the collapse of the USSR the following year. As late as 1989 the United States--along with Britain and France--had to veto a resolution condemning the American invasion of Panama. By early 1991 the Gulf War could be launched with Soviet assent and Arab participation, under cover of a deliberately vague Security Council resolution, passed with just one abstention. Victory in the cold war, knocking the USSR out of the ring, and the concomitant eclipse of nationalism by neoliberalism in the Third World, henceforward gave the United States more thoroughgoing real power over the UN than it had enjoyed even at the height of its postwar ascendancy, since it could now rely on the compliance, tacit or express, of Russia and China with its imperatives. Annan's Secretariat was one product of this change. The multiplication of UN peacekeeping missions in the '90s, offloading policing tasks of lesser strategic importance for the American imperium was another.
Paramountcy does not mean omnipotence. The United States cannot count on always securing UN legitimation of its actions ex ante. But where this is wanting, retrospective validation is readily available, as the occupation of Iraq has shown. What is categorically excluded is active opposition of the UN to any significant US initiative. A Security Council resolution, let alone a Secretary General, condemning an American action is unthinkable. Ban Ki-moon, whose appointment required Chinese assent, may keep a lower profile than Annan, but his role is unlikely to be very different. The US grip on the organization has not relaxed, as can be seen from recent UN resolutions on Lebanon and Iran, which the White House could never have obtained so easily before. Anxious voices from liberal opinion, worrying that the organization might become irrelevant if Bush's "unilateralism" persists, and plaintive appeals from the left to defend the UN from distortion by Washington, are regularly heard today. They can be reassured. The future of the United Nations is safe. It will continue to be, as it was intended to be, a serviceable auxiliary mechanism of the Pax Americana.
