Can terrorists be tamed?

Neumann's thesis is correct, but we mustn't draw the wrong conclusions from it, like engaging in reckless violence wherever al-Qaeda may be.

Can terrorists be tamed?

Peter R. Neumann

Wednesday, January 10, 2007 | The International Herald Tribune

LONDON

Last Thursday, Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of Spain, standing in front of the bleak new moonscape wrought by the bomb that ended ETA's cease-fire, promised to devote even more energy to pursuing an end to violence.

The same day, and displaying a similar determination, Prime Minister Tony Blair returned to a dank Britain after cutting short his winter sunshine break in Florida to try to avert yet another crisis in the talks process in Northern Ireland.

Both prime ministers' dedication is admirable. But can terrorists ever be tamed?

Just before the airport bomb, ETA had offered assurances that it would maintain its cease-fire. If it can't be trusted to negotiate in good faith, what hope is there for any kind of peace process to succeed? Critics such as Alan Dershowitz of Harvard University argue that all negotiations with terrorists are bound to end in failure. But these skeptics are wrong.

Negotiations should never be confused with appeasement, and it's not just the Europeans who are doing it. The Israelis, not normally known to be soft on terrorism, eventually sat down with the PLO to negotiate the Oslo peace accords.

And in Iraq, U.S. officials are desperate for the Baghdad government to give the political representatives of Sunni insurgents a stake in the political process. They all recognize that sometimes, talking may be just as smart as fighting.

In fact, negotiations can be an end in themselves; the more people talk, the less likely the violence.

Northern Ireland is a good example. In the 30 years prior to the 1998 peace agreement, the yearly death toll averaged around 80. Last year, it stood at just four. The very fact that the parties are talking to each other has saved lives.

And while there may be more political crises ahead, the sense of normality and tangible signs of economic prosperity that the peace process has generated make a return to the days of non-stop sectarian conflict near impossible.

Yet my own research shows that no peace process will succeed unless three conditions are met.

(1) The terrorists should be based in a clearly defined territory, where they can be integrated into the democratic process.

(2) They must maintain good internal discipline in order to minimize the risk of hard-line breakaway factions.

(3) And, most important, there must be a strong and consistent realization that there is little to gain from carrying on with the terrorist campaign.

For all of these reasons, the prospects of negotiations with Al Qaeda are remote. Al Qaeda is a transnational network with global aspirations. There is no single geographical territory where its aims could be satisfied through constitutional means.

Though Osama bin Laden has offered cease-fires to the United States and Europe, it is unlikely that his local leaders — such as the successors to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq — would feel bound by the outcome. And there is no indication at all that Al Qaeda is rethinking the use of violence.

On the contrary, if bin Laden's recent messages are anything to go by, the Qaeda leader clearly thinks he is winning. Under such conditions, negotiations would merely give the terrorists political legitimacy and make the negotiating governments look stupid.

The unintentional legacy of Al Qaeda's brand of terrorism has been to harden Western public opinion against terrorism from all sources.

When I recently interviewed a former IRA leader, I asked him what impact the events of Sept. 11 had on the conflict in Northern Ireland. He paused, choosing his words carefully. "After 9/11," he said, "you simply couldn't do this kind of thing anymore." In ETA's case, a similar realization occurred in the wake of the Madrid train bombings, when the group accepted the government's offer to engage in dialogue. This has worked to the benefit of peacemakers' efforts, despite the recent setbacks.

Dialogue with ETA has been suspended, and it is unlikely that negotiations will resume in the near future.

As in Northern Ireland, the Spanish government needs to make clear that violence is unacceptable and will not lead to political gains. To rule out negotiations altogether would be foolish and dishonest, but it is up to ETA now to demonstrate that its desire for a negotiated solution is genuine.