Disengagement in Iraq, not withdrawal

To help Baghdad, let it fend for itself

Edward N. Luttwak

February 6, 2007 | International Herald Tribune

The sooner President George W. Bush can get his extra troops for a "surge" in Iraq, the sooner he will be able to announce that all U.S. troops are coming home because of the inevitable failure of the Iraqi government to "live up to its side of the bargain."

In fact, in the run-up to the surge proposal, it is unlikely that there was any real bargaining before Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki was induced to issue promises — particularly in terms of government troops taking on Shiite militias — that he cannot possibly fulfill. Maliki, it seems, simply agreed to whatever was asked of him, to humor the White House and to retain American support for a little while longer.

For the Iraqi Army and police to disarm the Shiite militias, the prime minister would have to be a veritable Stalin or at least a Saddam Hussein, able to terrorize Iraqi soldiers into obedience. Maliki, of course, has no such authority over Iraqi soldiers — indeed he has little authority over his own cabinet, the members of which mostly represent sectarian parties with militias of their own.

Actually the situation is even worse than that, because only the Kurdish militias unfailingly obey their political leaders — one is the president of Iraq no less, Jalal Talabani — while, for the rest, it may be more true to say that Iraqi militias have political leaders to represent their wishes. The largest and most murderous of the Shiite militias, the Mahdi Army, which is invariably described as belonging to the truculent cleric Moktada al-Sadr, actually is divided under local commanders, some of whom obey Sadr some of the time. In sum, the most that Maliki can do is to not interfere when U.S. troops fight militias.

Nor can the Iraqi leader fulfill his other major promise: to lead a new effort to reconcile the warring sects of Iraq. He is not another Gandhi, but rather a leader of the fiercely sectarian Dawa Party. It is very much as a militant Shiite that he speaks out. It would be remarkable if Maliki could even reconcile with his Shiite rivals, let alone the Sunni insurgents.

Fortunately there is a promising, long- term policy waiting for Bush whenever he decides to call off his surge: disengagement. I don't mean a phased withdrawal, let alone total abandonment.

Rather it would start with a tactical change: American soldiers would no longer patrol towns and villages, conduct cordon-and-search operations or man checkpoints. An end to these tasks would allow the greatest part of the troops to head home. The remaining U.S. forces would hole up within safe bases in Iraq to support the elected government, deter foreign invasion, dissuade visible foreign intrusions, and strike at any large concentration of jihadis that should emerge. This would mean that U.S. personnel could not remain embedded in large numbers within the Iraqi Army. At most, the Americans would operate training programs within safe bases.

What would be the result of disengagement along these lines? First, it would not be likely to increase the violence afflicting Iraqi civilians. The total number of U.S. troops in Iraq is so small, and their linguistic skills so limited, that they have little effect on day-to-day security. Nor have they really protected Iraqis from one another.

Disengagement should actually reduce the violence. U.S. power has been interposed between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites. That has relieved the Shiite majority of responsibility to such an extent that many, notably the leaders of the Mahdi Army, feel free to attack the U.S. and British troops who are busy protecting their co-religionist civilians from Sunni insurgents. For many Arab Sunnis, on the other hand, the United States must be the enemy simply because it upholds the majority of the heretical Shiites.

Were the United States to disengage, both Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites would have to take responsibility for their own security, as the Kurds have been doing all along. Where these three groups are not naturally separated by geography, they would be forced to find ways to stabilize relations. That would most likely involve violence as well as talks, and some forcing of civilians from their homes. But this is happening already, and there is no saying which group would be most favored by a reduction of the U.S. footprint.

One reason for optimism on that score is that the violence itself has been separating previously mixed populations, reducing motives and opportunities for further attacks. That is how civil wars can burn themselves out. In any case, it is time for the Iraqis to make their own history.