Reply to Uncle T.: Bush 'duped' by CIA on Iraq aftermath?

Uncle T.,
Hooray for whose side? I'm rooting for America, and I hope you believe that anyone who wants us to get out of Iraq feels that way because he thinks it's best for our country.

You've basically adopted the line that Bush was "duped" by bad intelligence and a CIA itching for war with Saddam, because that helps you feel better about your President and your party. And it helps you feel better about giving up on the Iraq war now. So be it.

But the facts of recent history don't support your view. There was plenty of uncertainty about Iraq, and what would happen after a U.S. invasion. According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, two intelligence assessments before the Iraq invasion accurately predicted that toppling Saddam could lead to a dangerous period of internal violence and provide a boost to terrorists.

In January 2003, two months before the invasion, the U.S.National Intelligence Council warned that after Saddam was toppled, there was "a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other and that rogue Saddam loyalists would wage guerilla warfare either by themselves or in alliance with terrorists."

Former CIA Director George Tenet (whom Bush awarded a Medal of Freedom) included in his book the CIA's warning to the Administration dated August 13, 2002, six months before the invasion:

"The United States will face negative consequences with Iraq, the region and beyond which would include:

* Anarchy and the territorial breakup of Iraq;
* Region-threatening instability in key Arab states;
* A surge of global terrorism against US interests fueled by (militant) Islamism;
* Major oil supply disruptions and severe strains in the Atlantic Alliance."

Wrote William Harlow, part of Tenet's senior intelligence staff and co-author with Tenet on his book: "Although the intelligence got the WMD case in Iraq wrong, it got the dangers of a post-invasion Iraq quite right. They raised serious questions about what would face U.S. troops in a post invasion Iraq. The intelligence laid out a number of issues of concern. It's unclear if administration officials paid any attention to those concerns."

Even retired CIA analysts were so concerned, they spoke out in an open letter in February 2003 before Bush's imminent invasion of Iraq. Amazingly prescient, they wrote:

"Indeed, it is our view that an invasion of Iraq would ensure overflowing recruitment centers for terrorists into the indefinite future. Far from eliminating the threat it would enhance it exponentially.

"As recent events around the world attest, terrorism is like malaria. You don't eliminate malaria by killing the flies. Rather you must drain the swamp. With an invasion of Iraq, the world can expect to be inundated with swamps breeding terrorists. In human terms, your daughters are unlikely to be able to travel abroad in future years without a large phalanx of security personnel.

"We recommend you re-read the CIA assessment of last fall that pointed out that 'the forces fueling hatred of the US and fueling al Qaeda recruiting are not being addressed,' and that 'the underlying causes that drive terrorists will persist.'"

Bush either ignored these warnings, or his pro-invasion cabal refused to present them to the President. They all (including Colin Powell) chose to believe the rosiest of all possible scenarios, that we would be " greeted as liberators" in Iraq.

Barely 5 hours (!) after the plane hit the Pentagon, Rumsfeld was telling aides to come up with plans to attack Iraq. He refused at first to believe al Qaeda attacked us, he was so focused on Iraq, even though the CIA had intercepted a phone call that morning from an al Qaeda operative in Afghanistan to another in Georgia (former USSR) talking about the "good news" and more to come -- indicating he knew that the plane over Pennsylvania was yet to crash. Rumsfeld was told by the "bumbling" CIA that they had connections to the USS Cole bombing. Rumsfeld replied the evidence was "vague" and "might not mean something." Later that same day, Rumsfeld noted: "best info fast. Judge whether info good enough to hit S.H." -- meaning Saddam Hussein -- "at same time. Not only UBL" -- Usama bin Laden.

Retired Gen. Wesley Clark said on Meet the Press that the White House called him on 9/11 -- while he on CNN -- telling him 'You got to say this is connected. This is state-sponsored terrorism. This has to be connected to Saddam Hussein.' Clark asked them for evidence, but never received any.

Even as Bush said he preferred diplomacy, disarmament and the UN route, the Iraq invasion was being planned all throughout 2002. Former Bush Treasury Sec. Paul O'Neil said invading Iraq was " topic A" 10 days after Bush's inauguration!

Former Bush Admin. official Richard Clarke wrote this amazing insider's revelation:

"I expected to go back to a round of meetings [after September 11] examining what the next attacks could be, what our vulnerabilities were, what we could do about them in the short term. Instead, I walked into a series of discussions about Iraq. At first I was incredulous that we were talking about something other than getting Al Qaeda. Then I realized with almost a sharp physical pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq. Since the beginning of the administration, indeed well before, they had been pressing for a war with Iraq."

Richard Clark wrote further:

"By the afternoon on Wednesday [after Sept. 11], Secretary Rumsfeld was talking about broadening the objectives of our response and "getting Iraq." Secretary Powell pushed back, urging a focus on al Qaeda. Relieved to have some support, I thanked Colin Powell. "I thought I was missing something here," I vented. "Having been attacked by al Qaeda, for us now to go bombing Iraq in response would be like our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor."

On 9/13, ex-CIA chief, prominent neocon, and outspoken advocate of invading Iraq even before 9/11, James Woolsey published an op-ed urging an attack on Iraq, writing famously: "absence of evidence [of Iraq's involvement in 9/11] is not evidence of absence," (a line that both Cheney and Rumsfeld would borrow months later, this time when no WMD could be found in Iraq). In October 2001, Woolsey met with the Iraqi National Congress in London at the request of Wolfowitz. Bush had also asked Woolsey to lead the investigation into any possible links between Iraq, 9/11, and the DC anthrax attacks (which are still unsolved). Woolsey commented that there were "substantial and growing indications" that a state was behind the attacks." Commenting on the tenuous nature of Iraq's connection to al Qaeda (via Mohammed Atta in Prague) he said: "Hearsay is not admissible as evidence and almost all intelligence is hearsay. Evidentiary standards are the wrong standards. I would talk about indications, information." Woolsey added: "The United States has not yet decided it is at war with Saddam Hussein but Saddam Hussein may have decided he is at war with the United States."

On Sept. 15, Bush and his advisers met at Camp David. According to Bob Woodward's 2002 book, Bush at War, Wolfowitz advocated an attack on Iraq, perhaps even before an attack on Afghanistan. There was a 10 to 50 percent chance that Iraq had been involved in 9/11, he argued, concluding that Saddam's "brittle, oppressive regime" might succumb easily to an American attack -- in contrast to the difficulties involved in prosecuting war in the mountains of Afghanistan. Powell asked to focus on Afghanistan, not Iraq, and Bush agreed. But later at Camp David, Bush told his neocon advisor Richard Perle that once Afghanistan had been dealt with, it would be Iraq's turn.

The next day Rumsfeld asked again, "Is it now time to attack Iraq?" despite no evidence that Iraq was involved.

On Sept. 17 Bush issued a TOP SECRET directive to the Pentagon to plan for an attack on Afghanistan. Without any evidence that Iraq was involved in 9/11, Bush wrote a footnote asking them to start planning an Iraq attack as well. Plans to attack Iraq took on a momentum of their own, so much so that State Dept. officials were out of the loop, therefore they could not help plan for a post-invasion strategy.


It goes on and on like this, from 9/11/2001 all the way to 3/19/2003, when we invaded Iraq. 9/11 was just a pretext. Bush, and especially his neocon circle of advisers, were never interested in evidence or intel.

Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Libby, and a cabal of others inside and linked to the Bush Admin. saw 9/11 as an opportunity to take care of unfinished business and spread democracy in the Mideast; they did not believe that Iraq presented a clear and present danger to America.

Do you really believe that all the testimony from Administration insiders, and inside journalists like Bob Woodward and Seymour Hersh is because they're all partisan hacks with an axe to grind? With all the information that's out there about what REALLY happened, can you still seriously trust that Bush, et all were just innocent victims of the incompetent CIA?

I seriously doubt you'd be willing to believe the very best about Bill Clinton's intentions if he had done the exact same things as George W. Bush.

On 7/18/07, Uncle T. wrote:

So is this US intelligence better than the US intelligence that got us into the war in the first place or is it just a wild ass guess. My belief is that it is the latter . It may be true or it may be wholeheartedly wrong. Anyone who declares otherwise simply has blinders on. Hence this is another example of an article that says nothing other than "hooray for my side."