Some key observations on retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey's March 26 memorandum (report) on his 7-day visit to Iraq & Kuwait:
> McCaffrey did not meet with a single Iraqi, or non-USG staffer. Therefore, he could not have possibly got a complete picture from these interviews alone. That said, his remarks (if they are indeed simply a summary of what he was told) seem pretty balanced & realistic. The situation in Iraq is indeed "desperate;" and if we continue much longer with our current troop levels in Iraq, our forces will "degrade" and "we are likely to encounter a disaster."
> His profuse praise ("awe-inspiring," "magic," magnificent," "superb") of the US Military personnel, technology, and tactics in Iraq is irrelevant, because, despite all of that, we are not getting the results we want. We know that nobody can beat America in a stand-up fight. That's not the kind of war we're fighting there. The insurgents can probably take casualties at a rate of 6:1 or 10:1 for every American, indefinitely. Or they can simply lie low and wait us out, or focus their attacks on areas that have a lower US troop presence. (They are doing both now).
> All the loyal US Military guys are asking for one last chance to let Gen. Petraeus' new strategy work. But even if successful, what is the most that Petraues' military strategy can achieve? Only time, and space for Iraqi leaders (Kurd, Shia, and Sunni) to work out a political deal. McCaffrey recognizes this. He also recognizes the importance of involving regional players, who can facilitate an Iraqi peace. However, the Shias especially are probably reluctant to sit down with the minority Sunnis, since Shias feel they now have the upper hand over their former oppressors, and see no need to negotiate on equal terms. Also unfortunate is the fact that the Bush Administration is either unwilling or incapable to make constructive diplomacy with key neighbors Iran and Syria. According to Bush, you do not negotiate with "evildoers."
> Key remark: "They [the Western Sunni tribes] are also keenly aware of the fragility of the continued US presence that stands between them and a vengeful and overwhelming Shia-Kurdish majority class." In other words, the Sunnis know the US can't and won't stay much longer and protect them. McCaffrey also refers to the possibly "helpful" role of a Democratic Congress, which can play "bad cop" (my characterization, not McCaffrey's) to the Administration's "good cop" in negotiations with Iraqi PM Maliki. Hence, McCaffrey, perhaps unwittingly, admits the usefulness of a withdrawal timetable -- or the threat of withdrawal. Timetable proponents argue that giving a deadline for withdrawal would motivate (read: scare) the Sunnis into active political cooperation.
However, this still begs the question: Are Shias and Kurds willing to negotiate with Sunnis? That hope may be overly optimistic, especially without able and vigorous US diplomacy.
> Key remark: "The insurgency will continue in some form for a decade. This suggests the fundamental dilemma for US policymakers." How much longer will Americans support a failed war that costs $9 Billion and several hundred US casualties per month, with no political solution in sight? When will the sliding scale of optimism intersect the baseline of cold reality?
Conclusion: There will never be an ideal moment for US forces to withdraw. There is no military solution to Iraq, everyone realizes that now. And the Bush Administration is not willing or able to push all parties involved (Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Iranian, Syrian, et al) toward a political solution. Sooner or later, we'll have to accept the reality of defeat and cut our losses. Therefore, I say we stop the bleeding sooner rather than later. Withdraw from Iraq as soon as logistically possible.
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