Showing posts with label regulation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label regulation. Show all posts

Thursday, May 23, 2013

IRS and Congress must define 'political activity'

It's not the IRS's fault.  It's not even Tea Parties' fault, as I already said.  

Congress should give the IRS guidelines to help them determine what is "political" activity and what is not:

This issue was highlighted last Friday during a House hearing on IRS activity. Asked if he could define when a group applying for tax exemption as a 501(c)(4) “social welfare organization” is being too political, Steven T. Miller admitted that he could not say for sure. If the IRS’s former acting commissioner doesn’t know, it is impossible to expect front-line staff reviewing applications to know what to look for, nor for citizen advocacy groups to understand what rules govern their conduct.


By Gary D. Bass and Elizabeth J. Kingsley
May 24, 2013 | Washington Post

Monday, March 11, 2013

Fed: Lack of demand, not red tape & taxes, is the problem

Here's some interesting research from the Fed, based on National Federation of Independent Businesses monthly surveys of small business, that disproves what conservative pundits and economists have been saying about "burdensome regulations" and "uncertainty" holding back the U.S. economic recovery.

Read their executive summary and weep, teabaggers!

What explains the sharp decline in U.S. employment from 2007 to 2009? Why has employment remained stubbornly low? Survey data from the National Federation of Independent Businesses show that the decline in state-level employment is strongly correlated with the increase in the percentage of businesses complaining about lack of demand. While business concerns about government regulation and taxes also rose steadily from 2008 to 2011, there is no evidence that job losses were larger in states where businesses were more worried about these factors.

These findings support what Paul Krugman, et al have been saying all along.  Don't get me wrong, it's good to be a liberal, it's great to be right most of the time, but it's really sad and frustrating that the truth is so easily dismissed. Getting this stuff right affects the lives of millions!

UPDATE: Just to be fair & balanced, here's a link to an article by economist Jeffrey Sachs on why Paul Krugman is wrong, why he is a "crude Keynsian." Maybe later I'll refute Sachs in a separate post, although I will say that the major points he offers are special pleading, not backed up by data.


By Atif Mian and Amir Sufi
February 11, 2013 | FRBSF Economic Letter

Monday, October 15, 2012

'Weed whack' EPA regulations? Not so fast

'Weed whacker'?! What a terrible analogy! Everybody knows no-string lawn trimmers are superior. Romney obviously doesn't know his way around a man's yard.

Ironically, many of the U.S. environmental regulations that the GOP says are "strangling business" stretch back to Richard Nixon and George Bush, Sr.  

Anyway, if elected, could Romney fulfill his promise to take a "weed whacker" to President Obama's newer regulations on coal and other industries?  Not so fast:

But even if he's elected, Romney couldn't just snap his fingers and get rid of those regulations. His EPA appointees would have to propose rule changes, give the public time to comment on them, and present detailed scientific and legal justifications to prove that undoing or weakening the rules make sense.

"I think that will certainly be done. But it's not something that can be done overnight," says Jeff Holmstead, an industry lawyer who headed EPA's air pollution programs under the second President Bush.

Even if Romney were to undo the regulations, there would be another hurdle: Environmental groups surely would sue. Lawsuits from environmental groups effectively blocked the second President Bush's EPA from weakening some clean air rules.

"If you take a hard right turn on an environmental rule — or for that matter, a hard left turn — you've got strict constructionist judges who are going to say no, and they're on the federal courts today," says Kevin Book, director of ClearView Energy Partners, a Washington-based energy consulting firm.

Book says the federal judges who oversee EPA rules most likely would prevent big changes, regardless of who wins the election.

So if Romney can't keep his campaign promise then what could he do?  The classic GOP approach to regulatory (non-)enforcement:

"A President Romney could starve the agencies of money needed to enforce existing public health safeguards — in effect, take the environmental cop off the beat," says Dan Weiss, a volunteer adviser to the Obama campaign and a fellow at the action fund for the Center for American Progress, a left-leaning think tank.

Voila, problem solved, right?  Well, it means firms would still be breaking the law, they just wouldn't get caught.  But that's all that matters to Big Business and Republicans, I suppose.


Thursday, October 4, 2012

Johnson: Raise equity requirements for TBTF banks

Johnson's argument is a bit technical for us non-bankers, but the gist is this: regulators should force banks to hold more "tangible" equity -- meaning real money from investors -- as a share of their tangible assets.  A bank's tangible assets include customers' deposits (which are liabilities the bank must pay back).  

The truth is that nobody has come up with a good way to assess a bank's riskiness when they are so highly leveraged, no matter how much the banks may assure us they know how.  Right now, the banks basically regulate themselves, telling the regulators how risky they are.  This can't continue. 

Big banks resist a higher Tangible Common Equity (TCE) ratio because: 1) they can make a lot more profit using high leverage (over-borrowing) than they can raising equity from investors; and 2) if they make bad bets with borrowed money then we taxpayers will bail them out anyway.

If you're interested in this somewhat abstruse but absolutely crucial issue, you can learn more here.


By Simon Johnson
October 1, 2012 | Bloomberg

Monday, October 1, 2012

Whiskey fungus the next int'l. class-action lawsuit?

I visited the Jim Beam distillery in Kentucky a few years back. It was hard to find without a GPS, in the middle of nowhere. When we got there, we saw a bunch of wooden barns and buildings painted jet black, like some kind of Satanic village in the woods, like something out of a horror flick.

When I asked why, they said the smoke from the distillery discolored the wood, so they might as well paint it black.

Now I'm not so sure they were telling the truth.... I guess Milton Friedman's courts-as-regulators will sort it out, but in the meantime, I'll still keep sipping my KY bourbon and Scotch whisky.  



By Alan Fisher
September 16, 2012 | Al Jazeera

Monday, September 17, 2012

Corporations ain't people (redux)

Yeah, but Boards of Director are people, right?  Right, but what are their incentives?  Conservatives believe in incentives, so what's the company's officers' incentive to be human beings?  Zilch.  More precisely, those incentives exist, but they are not material or intrinsic to the corporation; they exist only in the ethics that corporate employees bring to their jobs.  Because there isn't any explicit reward in the corporate structure for individual responsibility and concern for the greater good, much less self-sacrifice, which in the corporate world entails a threat to one's job security, one's compensation, and perhaps to the company's bottom line.  

Furthermore, Tapscott is right to mention that corporations are psychopathic by the definition of the American Psychological Association (and psychopathic personalities are more common in corporations).  So what holds them back?  Regulators, first and foremost.  Without government regulators, corporations would be truly scary.  Second, what holds them back is whatever morality (or lack thereof) employees bring to their jobs, as mentioned. Third, we have the courts.

And so, the only meaningful checks on the abuses of corporations come from outside the corporation, and everybody agrees on that.  That's worth remembering.  

To wit, even right-wing ideologue Dr. Milton Friedman realized corporate excesses would have to be checked somehow.  Rather than regulations, he preached that society should rely on the courts to alleviate the externalities and suffering that corporations foist on their customers and non-customers alike.  (Never mind that sick people can't be made well, and the dead can't be resurrected, by courts, no matter what penalties or monetary awards they grant in retrospect.)  Even Milton Friedman acknowledged that corporations would do very bad things if left to their own devices.

Why?  Because corporations are not human.  When it comes to human beings in society, we're very particular about assigning responsibility (or blame) and holding individuals accountable.  Yet the genius, the key innovation of the corporation, is the limits it places on each shareholder, founder's or employee's liability for the bad stuff the corporation does, as well as the financial risks it takes.  

No such limits exist, nay, would be not tolerated, by society when it comes to individuals.  Conservatives are most adamant on that point; liberals, at least stereotypically, are the ones making all sorts of excuses for individuals' behavior: nurture, not nature, and societal forces and all that, they plead.  Such liberal "excuses" drive conservatives nuts.  And yet when it comes to corporations, whose main innovation in the history of mankind is to limit individual responsibility, and thereby make individual risk-taking more palatable, conservatives don't see any contradiction with their professed ethical-moral values.

This diffusion, or rather, dissipation, of moral responsibility has recently reached absurd proportions.  For example, how could one employee of Goldman Sachs, Fabrice Tourre, be held responsible (in a civil, not criminal, suit, mind you) for $3.2 billion fraudulent trades, and yet Goldman's management escape unscathed?  OK, Goldman paid a $550 million fine to the U.S Government while admitting no wrongdoing, but that fine was paid by Goldman's shareholders -- while investors in those fraudulent trades received nothing, and company officers kept their jobs.  Where's the accountability?  

And finally, Tapscott is right to mention the influence of the Internet on corporate transparency.  Is it any wonder that the fig leaf of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) coincides with the birth of the Internet?  But yet again, the Internet is external to the corporation; it depends on active citizens to monitor the activities of the corporation.  It is citizen-sponsored regulation, or external regulation by other means, and arguably not the most efficient means.

Tapscott's conclusion is dead on: "The blanket assertion that corporations are people obfuscates the complex issues at play in the changing business world. Corporation are institutions. People are people."


By Dan Tapscott
September 16, 2012 | Huffington Post

Friday, August 31, 2012

What's good for a business is not necessarily good for Business, or for Us

Since the 1980s, business schools have taught future executives that shareholder value maximization (SVM) is the best way to structure the operations of a firm and measure its performance.  Yet a few years ago, precipitated by the financial crisis, something changed.  Even Businessweek, one of the biggest cheerleaders of b-school since its ratings and admissions info is a cottage industry for the publication, acknowledged it in 2010: "How Business Schools Lost Their Way."  

No less than former GE CEO Jack Welch, the hero of many a business school case study, has seen the light and fallen from his high horse, calling SVM "the dumbest idea in the world."  Perhaps that's because GE lost 60 percent of its market value since Welch left in 2001?  Is GE that much worse now, or was it overvalued then?

Explaining what Welch meant, Forbes' Steve Denning argued that in practice, SVM is not so much about executives' maximizing the firm's value, but rather managing (or manipulating) investors' expectations of the firm's value.  Citing the example of GE, he concluded that Welch & Co. were clearly managing the firm's earnings with uncanny precision.  Denning argues for regulatory changes that could thwart the influence of managed earnings and managed expectations, and get business back to the previous dogma of management guru Peter Drucker that, "There is only one valid definition of a business purpose: to create a customer."  

Using other words, celebrated business leader Steve Jobs echoed Drucker's classic sentiment to biographer Walter Isaacson.


Meanwhile, alternative theories like the Triple Bottom Line and Porter's Shared Value have started to gain credence.  More companies are at least paying lip service to it, and the related concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).  Personally, I believe CSR is bunk.*  Expecting firms to focus on something other than their bottom line is misguided and naive, no matter what they state on their websites and annual reports.  It's not what they're made to do.  What are the internal incentives for firm employees to promote CSR?  Few or none.  Meanwhile, CSR gives irresponsible firms PR cover for their misdeeds.

(*When CSR really works is when consumer watchdogs, labor unions, environmentalists and other organizations shine the light of public scrutiny on the firm's lofty stated aspirations.  Yet this is just public regulation by other means -- and arguably not the most efficient means -- not the result of public altruism by the firm. And crucially, these public critics are often not even the firm's customers, shareholders or employees, but rather "stakeholders" in the most amorphous sense of CSR, meaning they may have no direct economic stake in the firm's performance.)

But I want to talk about the public arena.

Tragically, the theory of SVM has been accepted by many policy-makers and academics as the best model not only for individual firms, but also the model around which to structure our economy.  In effect, these public-sector cheerleaders of SVM gave up their prerogative and obligation to engage in precisely the kind of long-term planning for the common good that firm-level SVM is a incapable of doing.  What is good for the firm is the firm's decision; what is good for society is not.  It's ours, the people's.  

Yet too many have swallowed the Kool-Aid that the "invisible hand," i.e. the mystical, untraceable aggregate of millions of individual business decisions, leads to the best outcomes in all respects for society.  Taken to its logical conclusion, this misguided belief compels policy-makers and regulators not to meddle at all; they should get out of business's way and let the magical accounting of economic debits and credits do its thing.  Because better outcomes for society simply aren't achievable.  Nay, a committed group of human beings with a singular purpose has no purpose, in their view, outside the confines of the firm.  

(The one exception to this rule of human endeavor, conservatives tell us, is private charity, which they believe should replace publicly-funded safety nets.  Yet a simple look at poverty statistics pre- and post-LBJ show us that charity never was, and never can be, nearly adequate to "mop up" the Dickensian poor among us.  Indeed, the key failing of private charity -- with its high overhead, wasteful duplication, lack of scale, and most importantly, non-reporting on performance -- is that it is at its weakest when it's needed most: during economic downturns.)

Certainly, we must strive for a delicate balance between impeding business and giving it free dominion over society.  Unfortunately, today we hear many thinkers and politicians on the Right calling for chainsawing regulations and giving polluting industries and exploitative labor practices free reign over our economy -- all in the name of creating jobs.  Indeed, I have no doubt that gutting regulations would boost those firms' bottom lines in the short and even medium term, and even create jobs.  What worries me is the long term.  When our productivity suffers from lack of skills and capital that have been exported, never to return.  When unaccounted-for pollution creates enormous health costs which nevertheless exist in the real economy yet are absent in polluters' financial statements.  When we have privatized every government service and public asset until we are at the mercy of executives whose primary motivation is this year's bonus, and next year's "golden parachute."  

To whom then do we appeal for amelioration, when there is nobody to appeal to but impersonal market forces?


Friday, July 27, 2012

We're so screwed

When our regulators and politicians believe that revealing banksters' crimes is more "dangerous" and "destabilizing" than the crimes themselves, then you know we're totally screwed.


By Richard Zombeck
July 26, 2012 | Huffington Post

Friday, July 13, 2012

Brain science: Why big bankers behave badly

Like most things in life, science can explain why big bankers are sleazeballs.  It's 30+ years of deregulation and financial bubbles that put at least two generations of bankers in permanent "kill" mode, focused on power, conquest and reward, while they're oblivious to risks and downsides.

It's evolution and brain science, folks.  It's incontrovertible.  And if you don't buy it then you're an ideologue.  These sleazeballs need a hard slap of negative reinforcement -- regulation, prosecutions, and jail time -- to re-wire their reptilian brains.


The unconstrained power of bankers acts like a drug on their brains' reward systems, creating insatiable appetites
By Ian Robertson
July 2, 2012 | Guardian

Thursday, May 10, 2012

Taibbi: How Wall St. killed Dodd-Frank after it passed

Concludes Taibbi, sadly:

But money never gets tired.  It never gets frustrated. And it thinks that drilling holes in Dodd-Frank is every bit as interesting as The Book of Mormon or Kate Upton naked. The system has become too complex for flesh-and-blood people, who make the mistake of thinking that passing a new law means the end of the discussion, when it's really just the beginning of a war.


It's bad enough that the banks strangled the Dodd-Frank law. Even worse is the way they did it - with a big assist Congress and the White House.
By Matt Taibbi
May 10, 2012 | Rolling Stone

It's safe to forget about the SAFE Act

I hope there is hope for the SAFE Act to break up the TBTF banks, or at least forbid them from having a "leverage ratio" of more than 10 to 1, but I suspect this bill will be DOA, thanks to the campaign money of Wall Street.


By Simon Johnson
May 10, 2012 | New York Times

Thursday, May 3, 2012

Paul Ryan's guru: Our Medicare plan won't work

The mastermind of Paul Ryan's Medicare reform plan, Henry Aaron, has changed his mind, based on -- gasp! -- evidence that his theories didn't pan out: "The evidence to date is not encouraging," Aaron testified, noting a recent study that isolated the effects of competition on Medicare Advantage costs from government-related influences. "After controlling for all those factors, Medicare Advantage plans are more expensive than is traditional Medicare."

Premium support is key to Ryan's plan.  Ryan has assumed that if free markets are left to work by themselves (health insurance exchanges) then prices will eventually come down; and the gov't. should provide a small subsidy to pay for premiums in the meantime.

But Aaron went on to say, with Rep. Ryan in the audience, that premium support as envisioned in Obamacare should be left to work, to see if his ideas have any merit:

The passage of the Affordable Care Act means we have put in place a key element of the premium support idea for the rest of the population, namely health insurance exchanges.  The Medicare population is vastly more difficult to deal with than the population under the Affordable Care Act. We should prove that the health insurance exchanges work, get them up and running before we take seriously, in my view, calls to put the Medicare population through a similar system.

Aaron also noted that the current "pro-business" Republican Congress won't enact the strict regulation needed to prevent insurance companies gaming the system:  "The regulatory climate has changed.  It is far more hostile to the kinds of regulatory intervention that...I thought were essential."


By Michael McAuliff
May 3, 2012 | Huffington Post

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Progressive California pulling the rest with it, again

Thank goodness for the United State of California, the 8th largest economy in the world. When California says "jump," industry asks "how high?"

California is so big that their progressive reforms will trickle down to the Red States and flyover country, too -- in fact all over the world. This is the very opposite of the "race to the bottom," the dark side of globalization.


By Naoki Schwartz
January 13, 2012 | Huffington Post

Thursday, October 20, 2011

World Bank: U.S. a great place for doing business

At the same time that corporations and right-wing politicians' argue that "job-killing regulations" are to blame for America's current economic malaise, the USA has moved up in the annual Doing Business rankings by the World Bank -- from 5th place to 4th.

As last year, only tiny islands managed to be more business-friendly than the good ole US of A.

Looks like somebody doesn't know what the hell they're talking about.


The World Bank Group
October 20, 2011

Monday, August 22, 2011

Fuel economy standards make strange bedfellows

Great example of Big Guvmint regulation spurring innovation -- and even cooperation among fierce business rivals!

Can cats and dogs learn to get along? Only if Washington regulates it!

¡Viva el Gran Gobierno!


By Chris Woodyard
August 22, 2011 | USA TODAY


Wednesday, August 3, 2011

Credit rating agencies' conflict of interest

America's slavery to the credit rating agencies is even more lamentable considering that these agencies have a huge conflict of interest: they're lobbying the same U.S. government which they're threatening to downgrade to keep their (private) ratings embedded in U.S. financial regulations.

Even the recent debt ceiling deal has not ended their threats to downgrade America's credit rating. Coincidence? Is there really any doubt among reasonable people that the U.S. Government can't or won't honor its debts? I mean, short-term U.S. Treasury bills are synonymous in finance with risk-free assets.


By Bethany McLean
August 2, 2011 | Slate

Everyone hates the big credit rating agencies—Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch. Europeans resent the clout that they wield. Democrats hate them for their complicity in expanding the subprime mortgage market that brought down the economy and left us with a 9 percent unemployment rate. Republicans, though they're generally opposed to the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation, have no love for the credit rating agencies, either. The conservative Wall Street Journal columnist Holman Jenkins, in a July 27 column headlined "Who Elected The Rating Agencies?," called section 939A of Dodd-Frank, which requires federal regulations to be stripped of all references to credit ratings, a "rare useful provision." Citing section 939A, David Zervos, the head of global fixed-income strategy at Jefferies, calls the noise the credit raters are currently making about downgrading U.S. Treasuries a "last gasp of hot air."

Yet the stock performance of the rating agencies doesn't suggest that they're losing their relevance. Moody's stock is one of the best-performing for any big U.S. company this year. There may be a good reason. Last week, the House financial services committee held a hearing about the rating agencies. Much of it was devoted to the possibility that the agencies would downgrade the United States, but the various witnesses brought prepared statements about the progress of section 939A. After reading these, I'm not convinced that this important reform is going to happen.

The ratings agencies would like you to believe that the source of their power is the accuracy of their opinions. But in fact, its true source is the extent to which their ratings have been embedded in various rules and regulations across the financial world. It all started back in 1975, when the Securities and Exchange Commission began to use such ratings to calculate how much capital broker-dealers should be required to hold. To prevent the proliferation of fly-by-night raters, the SEC designated a handful of firms as "nationally recognized statistical rating organizations," or NRSROs. By the time the financial crisis hit, NRSRO ratings were embedded in thousands of regulations and private contracts, if not more, determining what securities money-market funds would be permitted to own, how much collateral counterparties would have to put up in trades, and countless other arcane matters. At the hearing, Mark Van Der Weide of the Federal Reserve testified that Fed regulations contained no fewer than 46 references or requirements regarding credit ratings. In theory, section 939A will bring an end to the NRSROs' regulatory power. Every federal agency is required "to remove any reference to or requirement of reliance on credit ratings and to substitute in such regulations such standard of credit-worthiness as each respective agency shall determine as appropriate."

"With the elimination of regulatory reliance on ratings, the entire NRSRO superstructure should be dismantled," testified Larry White, a professor at New York University and a longtime critic of the agencies. Moody's and S&P themselves say they want to be taken out. The agencies say their ratings should speak for themselves and not carry the force of law. Why they should favor a law that weakens them is a bit of a mystery, but perhaps the answer is that so many others are willing to argue their case for them. Several witnesses at last week's hearing voiced resistance to section 939A taking effect:

"Just as it is not feasible or practical for us or other institutional investors to simply stop using credit ratings altogether, it may not be feasible or practical for federal agencies to strike, in one fell swoop, ratings from all of their rules and regulations," said Gregory Smith, the chief operating officer and general counsel of the Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association. "We encourage regulators to take a careful, deliberate approach to eliminating references to ratings over time. "

Consider the issue of removing ratings from the process of determining how much capital banks must hold against various exposures. The banks say that there isn't a ready alternative. Smaller banks argue that they don't have the resources to use anything other than credit ratings, which are relatively cheap and easy, and that if forced to find alternatives they'll have a harder time competing against large banks. The large banks argue that if they can't use credit ratings, they'll have a harder time competing against foreign banks, which still use ratings. Indeed, the Federal Reserve reported that replacing credit ratings could "lead to competitive distortions across the global banking system and the domestic banking landscape."

That reference to the "global banking system" gets to another problem: Despite European dislike of the American rating agencies, ratings are ingrained in the global capital standards--even those implemented after the 2008 sub-prime crisis, which exposed the ratings agencies' unreliability. As the OCC's David Wilson pointed out, the latest global regulatory framework ("Basel III") continues to use ratings to judge creditworthiness. "U.S. regulators cannot conform our capital standards to those agreed to internationally if section 939A precludes any reference to or reliance on credit ratings," wrote Wilson in his statement.

One year ago, as U.S. regulators began soliciting comments from the banking industry about what they should use instead of credit ratings, the gist of what they heard back was this: Don't mess with our ratings. "Generally, comments received did not concretely identify or suggest alternative standards of credit-worthiness," the FDIC said in its hearing statement. "Most commenters … argued that credit ratings are valuable tools in evaluating credit risk." The OCC's Wilson reported that "a majority of the commenters said that the OCC should continue to use credit ratings in its regulations."

This lingering attachment to the ratings agencies isn't limited to banks and regulators. Investors—yes, the very same people who got burned relying on the rating agencies three years ago—don't want to see them go. As Gellert, the CEO of Rapid Ratings, put it, "There are many market players who benefit from, and support, the status quo." If investors no longer have ratings to rely on, then they'll have to do the credit analysis themselves. If they're wrong, they won't be able to blame those accursed rating agencies! And as Gellert explained, the allure of ratings goes beyond the avoidance of responsibility. Ratings actually help investors game the system. In what's known on the Street as "ratings arbitrage," funds that are statutorily prohibited from buying non-investment-grade bonds buy the highest yielding bonds with the lowest investment grade rating that they can find, thereby juicing their returns. That creates an artificial demand for securities that don't merit the rating they received, at least by the market's judgment. Ratings arbitrage is what put the most dangerous mortgage-backed securities in greatest demand at the peak of the subprime madness.

Investors don't just want to keep credit ratings around—they want to keep credit ratings from the current big three. After the crisis, in 2010, Jules Kroll, a well-known investigator, formed Kroll Bond Ratings in order to provide investors with an alternative. But Kroll noted in his testimony that investors often require before they'll buy a security that it have not just a rating, but a rating from Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and/or Fitch. Kroll Bond Ratings took an informal survey of the top 100 pension funds, and found that of the 67 that published their guidelines, almost two-thirds required a rating from at least one of the top three firms. "It is self-evident that this practice further entrenches the incumbent rating agencies," wrote Kroll in his prepared remarks.

In fairness, the regulators, or at least the SEC, do still seem to be plodding gamely ahead. In March, the SEC proposed to remove credit ratings from the rules that govern which securities a money market fund may purchase. Gellert says that his business is doing very well, because although investors may still be using ratings from the big three, they're also eager for another opinion. That can only help. And he says that at the hearing he saw bipartisan support for removing ratings from regulations.

Then again, on July 21, in a little-noticed vote, the House financial services committee approved (over the objections of Massachusetts Rep. Barney Frank, ranking Democrat on the committee and one of the named authors of Dodd-Frank) a repeal of the part of Dodd-Frank that (quite reasonably) subjects the credit rating agencies to "expert liability," meaning that if the ratings agencies screw up they'll face the same legal risk as accountants and other third party advisers in bond sales. The July 29 Wall Street Journal reported that various business groups, including the Chamber of Commerce, are suing the government to overturn various parts of Dodd Frank that they don't like. The Journal piece didn't mention section 939A, but it would seem a likely target. According to the OCC's testimony, some in the industry are already recommending a "legislative change" to the section. Loathe them though everyone does, reliance on the credit rating agencies turns out to be a terrible habit that almost no one is willing to break.

Thursday, July 14, 2011

Doing Business 2011 benchmark

Now for those of you who think the USA has become a socialist backwater, here's another international benchmark for you.

The U.S. ranks 5th overall in the world in Ease of Doing Business, 9th in ease of Starting a Business, 6th in getting credit, 5th in protecting investors, and 8th in enforcing contracts.

Keep in mind that Republicans' only concrete ideas for creating jobs and improving the U.S. economy are: 1) cutting the federal debt; 2) cutting taxes on the rich; and 3) cutting "costly" regulations. Never mind that 1) will create more unemployment, and 2) has tried and failed throughout the 'oughts, but regarding 3), you have to ask yourself, U.S. regulations are costly compared to what country -- actually, compared to what island?

We also see Euro-socialist Denmark and semi-socialist Canada popping up in the top 10:

1 Singapore
2 Hong Kong SAR, China
3 New Zealand
4 United Kingdom
5 United States
6 Denmark
7 Canada
8 Norway
9 Ireland
10 Australia


Measuring Business Regulations
The World Bank | July 2011

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

S**tburgers served up by unfettered free markets



Actually, thank Zombie Reagan for shitburgers.

By the way, those Reaganite necrophiliacs, er, hagiographers at the Committee to Name Everything After Reagan just erected another statue of him in London; meanwhile his deregulation is killing more Americans every year than died on 9/11.


By Yasha Levine
June 22, 2011 | The Exiled

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

Taibbi: How Geithner and Dems screwed financial reform

This is long but this article really shows what's becoming Taibbi's specialty: describing the disgusting, step-by-step process of Congressional sausage-making. What legislation starts out looking semi-promising, with about 40% real meat, gets ripped apart and replaced with bone fragments and floor sweepings, then sewn up in a nice attractive casing with lots of PR and back-patting, all for our consumption.

Make no mistake, Geithner and the Democrats killed financial reform. The GOP would have killed it happily -- they wouldn't have proposed it in the first place -- but they were really irrelevant this time. If the Democrats had wanted it, they could have had it, and the left would have loved them for it. But instead they showed once again tthat hey serve the same master as the Republicans, only they wear a different uniform.


Wall Street's Big Win
Finance reform won't stop the high-risk gambling that wrecked the economy - and Republicans aren't the only ones to blame

By Matt Taibbi
August 4, 2010 Rolling Stone

Cue the credits: the era of financial thuggery is officially over. Three hellish years of panic, all done and gone – the mass bankruptcies, midnight bailouts, shotgun mergers of dying megabanks, high-stakes SEC investigations, all capped by a legislative orgy in which industry lobbyists hurled more than $600 million at Congress. It all supposedly came to an end one Wednesday morning a few weeks back, when President Obama, flanked by hundreds of party flacks and congressional bigwigs, stepped up to the lectern at an extravagant ceremony to sign into law his sweeping new bill to clean up Wall Street.

Obama's speech introducing the massive law brimmed with celebratory finality. He threw around lofty phrases like "never again" and "no more." He proclaimed the end of unfair credit-card-rate hikes and issued a fatwa on abusive mortgage practices and the shady loans that helped fuel the debt bubble. The message was clear: The sheriff was padlocking the Wall Street casino, and the government was taking decisive steps to unfuck our hopelessly broken economy.

But is the nightmare really over, or is this just another Inception-style trick ending? It's hard to figure, given all the absurd rhetoric emanating from the leadership of both parties. Obama and the Democrats boasted that the bill is the "toughest financial reform since the ones we created in the aftermath of the Great Depression" – a claim that would maybe be more impressive if Congress had passed any financial reforms since the Great Depression, or at least any that didn't specifically involve radically undoing the Depression-era laws.

The Republicans, meanwhile, were predictably hysterical. They described the new law – officially known as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act – as something not far from a full-blown Marxist seizure of the means of production. House ­Minority Leader John Boehner shrieked that it was like "killing an ant with a nuclear weapon," apparently forgetting that the ant crisis in question wiped out about 40 percent of the world's wealth in a little over a year, making its smallness highly debatable.

But Dodd-Frank was neither an FDR-style, paradigm-shifting reform, nor a historic assault on free enterprise. What it was, ultimately, was a cop-out, a Band-Aid on a severed artery. If it marks the end of anything at all, it represents the end of the best opportunity we had to do something real about the criminal hijacking of America's financial-services industry. During the yearlong legislative battle that forged this bill, Congress took a long, hard look at the shape of the modern American economy – and then decided that it didn't have the stones to wipe out our country's one ­dependably thriving profit center: theft.

It's not that there's nothing good in the bill. In fact, there are many good things in it, even some historic things. Sen. Bernie Sanders and others won a fight to allow Congress to audit the Fed's books for the first time ever. A new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was created to protect against predatory lending and other abuses. New lending standards will be employed in the mortgage industry; no more meth addicts buying mansions with credit cards. And in perhaps the biggest win of all, there will be new rules forcing some varieties of derivatives – the arcane instruments that Warren Buffett called "financial weapons of mass destruction" – to be traded and cleared on open exchanges, pushing what had been a completely opaque market into the light of day for the first time.

All of this is great, but taken together, these reforms fail to address even a tenth of the real problem. Worse: They fail to even define what the real problem is. Over a long year of feverish lobbying and brutally intense backroom negotiations, a group of D.C. insiders fought over a single question: Just how much of the truth about the financial crisis should we share with the public? Do we admit that control over the economy in the past dec­ade was ceded to a small group of rapacious criminals who to this day are engaged in a mind-­numbing campaign of theft on a global scale? Or do we pretend that, minus a few bumps in the road that have mostly been smoothed out, the clean-hands capitalism of Adam Smith still rules the day in America? In other words, do people need to know the real version, in all its majestic whorebotchery, or can we get away with some bullshit cover story?

In passing Dodd-Frank, they went with the cover story.

During an other-wise deathly boring year spent covering this debate, I learned to derive some entertainment from watching politicians scramble to give floor speeches about financial reform without disclosing the fact that they didn't have the first fucking clue what a credit-default swap is, or how a derivative works. This was certainly true of Democrats, but the Republicans were way, way better at it. Their strategy was brilliant in its simplicity: Don't even bother trying to figure out the math-y stuff, and instead just blame the entire crisis on government efforts to make homeowners of lazy black people. "Private enterprise mixed with social engineering" was how Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama put it, with a straight face, not long before the bill passed.

The argument favored by Wall Street lobbyists and Obama's team of triangulating pro-business Democrats was more subtle. In this strangely metaphysical version of recent history, the economy was ­ruined by bad luck and a few bad actors, not by any particular law or policy. It was the "guns don't kill people, people kill people" argument expanded to cover global financial fraud. "There is an assumption that math is evil," insisted Keith Hennessey, a member of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, at a hearing in June. "Credit-default swaps are things, and things can't be culprits."

Both of these takes were engineered to avoid an uncomfortable political truth: The huge profits that Wall Street earned in the past decade were driven in large part by a single, far-reaching scheme, one in which bankers, home lenders and other players exploited loopholes in the system to magically transform subprime home borrowers into AAA investments, sell them off to unsuspecting pension funds and foreign trade unions and other suckers, then multiply their score by leveraging their phony-baloney deals over and over. It was pure ­financial alchemy – turning ­manure into gold, then spinning it Rumpelstiltskin-style into vast profits using complex, mostly unregulated new instruments that almost no one outside of a few experts in the field really understood. With the government borrowing mountains of Chinese and Saudi cash to fight two crazy wars, and the domestic manufacturing base mostly vanished overseas, this massive fraud for all intents and purposes was the American economy in the 2000s; we were a nation subsisting on an elaborate check-­bouncing scheme.

And it was all made possible by two major deregulatory moves from the Clinton era: the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which allowed investment banks, insurance companies and commercial banks to merge, and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which ­exempted the entire derivatives market from federal regulation. Together, these two laws transformed Wall Street into a giant casino, allowing commercial banks to act like high-risk hedge funds, with a whole new galaxy of derivative bets to lay action on. In fact, the laws made Wall Street even crazier than a casino, because in a casino you have to put up actual money to make bets. But thanks to deregulation, financial companies like AIG could bet billions, if not trillions, without having any money at all to back up their gambles.

Dodd-Frank was never going to be a meaningful reform unless these two fateful Clinton-era laws – commercial banks gambling with taxpayer money, and unregulated derivatives being traded in the dark – were reversed. The story of how the last real shot at reining in Wall Street got routed tells you everything you need to know about how, and on whose behalf, our government works. It was Congress at its most cowardly, deceptive best, with both parties teaming up to subject reform to death by a thousand paper cuts – with the worst cuts coming, literally, in the final moments before the bill's passage.

The first of the two final battles coalesced around an effort by Sens. Carl Levin of Michigan and Jeff Merkley of Oregon to implement the so-called "Volcker rule," a proposal designed to restore the firewall between investment houses and commercial banks. At the heart of Merkley-Levin was one key section: a ban on proprietary trading.

"Prop trading" is just a fancy term for banks gambling in the market for their own profit. Thanks to the Clinton-era deregulation, giant commercial banks like JP Morgan Chase were not only allowed to serve as investment banks, accumulating mountains of privileged insider information, they were allowed to play the markets themselves. That meant that the prop-trading desk at Goldman Sachs could bet heavily against Greek debt not long after the bank had saddled Greece with toxic interest-rate swaps. It also meant that if any of these "too big to fail" banks went bust, American taxpayers would be expected to bail them out. The Volcker rule – pushed by Paul Volcker, the former Fed chief and current Obama adviser – aimed to lay down a simple law for big banks: If you want to gamble like a drunken sailor, fine. Just don't expect us to mop up the mess after you puke your guts out.

If Obama's team had had their way, last month's debate over the Volcker rule would never have happened. When the original version of the finance-­reform bill passed the House last fall – heavily influenced by treasury secretary and noted pencil-necked Wall Street stooge Timothy Geithner – it contained no attempt to ban banks with federally insured deposits from engaging in prop trading. But that changed when Scott Brown, the Tea Party darling from Massachusetts, blindsided the Democrats by wresting away the seat of deceased liberal icon Ted Kennedy. With voters seething over Wall Street's rampant thievery and fraud, the Democrats suddenly got religion about reckless gambling by the financial industry.

Brown won his election on January 19th; just two days later, on January 21st, President Obama pulled a 180 and announced his support for the Volcker rule. Throughout the reform process, Volcker – a legendary figure whose demands for greater responsibility and transparency have alarmed Wall Street – had been forced to take a back seat to Geithner, at one point even sharply criticizing the House bill in open testimony. For the White House to suddenly throw its weight behind Volcker took the Hill by surprise. It was a "complete change of policy – a fundamental shift," observed Simon Johnson, an MIT economist and noted financial analyst.

This was clearly the administration's ­attempt to get back on the right side of populist anger at Wall Street. So when Merkley and Levin took up the job of transforming Volcker's proposal into legislative reality, they assumed the Democratic leadership would be on their side.

It didn't work out that way. The counter­attack began in May, when the Republicans objected to Merkley-Levin and invoked the Senate's unanimous-consent rule, by which no amendment comes to the floor unless all 100 members agree to let it be voted on. That left the Volcker rule in legislative purgatory right up to the initial Senate vote on the bill. In interviews, the soft-spoken, gregarious Merkley steadfastly refuses to point the finger at the Democratic leadership for failing to break the legislative logjam. But reading between the lines, it's obvious that he and Levin were on their own – no one with any juice in the key committees lifted a finger to help them. The two senators were like underage geeks who'd been told by ­Majority Leader Harry Reid that they had to come up with their own keg if they wanted to come to the party.

But come up with a keg they did. On the week of the first Senate vote, Merkley's staffers pored over Senate procedural rules and discovered an arcane clause that allowed them to attach their proposal to an amendment by Republican Sam Brownback of Kansas designed to exempt auto dealers from regulation by the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The Brownback amendment had already been approved for a vote, so once Merkley's people used the remora-fish tactic of sticking to Brownback, there was seemingly no way to prevent Merkley-Levin from going to a vote.

Or so they thought. "We were plumbing the inner rules of the Senate," ­Merkley says. One of those rules is that when you attach your amendment to another, your measure has to be "germane" to the amendment you're attaching it to. Since Merkley-Levin's ban on prop trading and Brownback's auto-dealer exemption were completely different, this was not a simple thing to accomplish. So ­Merkley and Levin personally trekked down to one of the more obscure offices in the ­congressional complex.

"Carl Levin and I went on a trip down to the parliamentarian's office, where I'd never been," Merkley says. "They briefed us on what it took, and the team set about to make it work."
From there, Merkley and Levin hit the phones to lobby other members, including Republicans. Right up to the final vote on May 20th, they thought they had a real shot. "I got the sense that we might pick up quite a few Republican votes," says Merkley. "It was starting to look pretty good."

But that very fact that the Merkley-Levin amendment had such momentum is ultimately what did it in. "What killed us," says Merkley, "was that it was looking pretty good."

What happened next was a prime example of the basic con of congressional politics. Throughout the debate over finance reform, Democrats had sold the public on the idea that it was the Republicans who were killing progressive initiatives. In reality, Republican and Democratic leaders were working together with industry insiders and deep-pocketed lobbyists to prevent rogue members like Merkley and Levin from effecting real change. In public, the parties stage a show of bitter bipartisan stalemate. But when the cameras are off, they fuck like crazed weasels in heat.

With Merkley-Levin looking like a good bet to pass, the Republicans pulled a dual-suicide maneuver. Brownback withdrew his auto-dealer exemption, which instantly killed the ban on prop trading. What Merkley and Levin didn't know was that Brownback had worked out an agreement with the Democratic leadership to surreptitiously restore his auto-dealer exemption later on, when the final bill was reconciled with the House version. In other words, Democratic leaders had teamed up with Republicans behind closed doors to double-­cross Merkley and Levin.

When the agreement was announced one day before the Senate vote, Merkley couldn't even make sense of what he was hearing. "You're sitting there trying to understand what kind of deal has been struck," he says. "You know there's something there, but you're not really sure." Merkley almost objected to the deal, but unable to grasp that he had been sold out by his own party's leadership, he hesitated – a fatal mistake. The deal to reinstate Brownback went through, and Merkley's amendment to rein in Wall Street died.

That might have been the end of the Volcker rule – but soon after, Merkley and Levin made the most of their one last chance. According to Merkley, he and Levin convinced Rep. Barney Frank, who was overseeing the House bill, to reintroduce the amendment in conference talks. The Volcker rule was alive again – but it now began a journey into a new sort of hell, in which insiders from both parties chipped away at it until there was almost nothing left.

It started with Senate rookie Scott Brown, who demanded major changes to Merkley-Levin on behalf of big Massachusetts banks in exchange for his vote. But Senate sources I talked to insist that Chris Dodd, the powerful chair of the Senate Banking Committee, was just using Brown as a cover to gut the Volcker rule. "It became far more than accommodating the Massachusetts banks," says one high-­ranking Senate aide. "It became a ruse for Treasury trying to get as far as they could, with Dodd's help."

From the start, Dodd had been opposed to the ban on proprietary trading. "Hey, I would gladly dump the Volcker rule," he told industry lobbyists. "But I can't, because of the pressure I'm getting from the left." Now, with Brown pressing for concessions, Dodd agreed to let Merkley-Levin be spattered with a wave of loopholes. If you can imagine a 4,000-pound lizard pretending to cower before a Cub Scout clutching a lollipop, then you've grasped the basic dynamic of a grizzled legislative titan like Dodd caving into Brown, the cheery GOP newbie with the Pez-­dispenser face.

First, in what amounted to an open handout to the financial interests represented by Brown, insurers, mutual funds and trusts were exempted from the Merkley-Levin ban. Then, with the floodgates officially open, every financial company in America was granted a massive loophole – one that allowed them to skirt the ban on risky gambling by investing a designated percentage of their holdings in hedge funds and private-equity companies.

The common justification for this loophole, known as the de minimis exemption, was that banks need it to retain their "traditional businesses" and remain competitive against hedge funds. In other words, Congress must allow banks to act like hedge funds because otherwise they'd be unable to compete with hedge funds in the hedge-fund business. With the introduction of the de minimis exemption, Merkley-Levin went from being an absolute ban on federally insured banks engaging in high-risk speculation to a feeble, half-assed restriction that will be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.

The driving force behind the exemption was not Scott Brown, but the Obama administration itself. By all accounts, Geithner lobbied hard on the issue. "Treasury's official position went from opposed to supportive," one aide told reporters. "They may have even overshot Brown's desires by a bit." Throughout the negotiations over the bill, in fact, Geithner acted almost like a liaison to the financial industry, pushing for Wall Street-friendly changes on everything from bailouts (his initial proposal ­allowed the White House to unilaterally fork over taxpayer money to banks in unlimited amounts) to high-risk investments (he fought to let megabanks hold on to their derivatives desks).

Geithner went all out for the de minimis exemption; one Senate aide was told flatly by "those who are in charge of counting noses" that the proposal was not subject to negotiation. This was the horse-head-in-the-bed moment of the Dodd-Frank bill – the offer that couldn't be refused. "We were told that there needed to be de minimis or there would be no bill," the aide says.

When Merkley first got the news about the exemption, he tried to keep it small. "I was hoping to limit it to one percent" of a company's tangible equity, he says. "The night before the conference, Geithner was pushing for two percent. In the end, it got even worse – it was three percent." When Merkley tried to put a specific dollar limit of $250 million on high-risk gambling, Geithner shot him down. "He didn't want the sub-cap, and we lost," Merkley says.

Still, during the last round of negotiations, Merkley and Levin managed to pare back some of the worst of the exemptions. In one victory, they eliminated a proposal by Geithner that would have allowed banks to make unlimited trades "in facilitation of customer relations" – a loophole so laughably broad that it would cover, in the words of one Senate aide, "pretty much everything" that banks wanted to do. By June 25th, when the bill headed to its final meeting of the conference committee, it looked like Merkley and Levin would ­finally get their vote.

But that was before the senator from Wall Street showed up. In the final hours of negotiations, a congressional delegation from New York, led by Sen. Chuck Schumer, decided to take one last run at gutting the Volcker rule. It was as though someone had sent the scrubs off the court and called in the varsity. Schumer, a platitudinous champion of liberal social ­issues, moonlights as a pillbox-hat bellhop to Wall Street on economic matters. The self-­aggrandizing New Yorker has not only fought to keep taxes low on hedge-fund billionaires, he got up onstage with Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein at a Democratic fundraiser in 2006 and performed "nostalgic furniture-store jingles."

This bears repeating: The person in whose hands America had placed its hopes for finance reform was someone who once sang furniture jingles onstage with Lloyd Blankfein.

Now, as the bill headed into final negotiations, the Schumer coalition suddenly decided that the de minimis exemption for banks simply wasn't big enough. In a neat trick, Schumer's crew agreed to keep the exemption at three percent – but they raised the limit dramatically by making it three percent of something else. Instead of being pegged to a bank's "tangible equity," the exemption would now be calculated based on a financial firm's "Tier 1" capital – a far bigger pool of money that includes a bank's common shares and deferred-tax assets instead of just preferred shares. In real terms, banks could now put up to 40 percent more into high-risk investments. "It was almost double what Geithner was talking about the night before," says Merkley. "For Bank of America alone, it comes to $6 billion."

Schumer himself entered the change in the Senate version of the bill – and then asked the House to sign off on it 15 minutes later. Rep. Paul Kanjorski of Pennsylvania, who had worked hard on the Volcker rule, tried to get a vote to block the change. But Barney Frank laid into him. "You had plenty of time with this," Frank barked. "You knew what was coming – siddown."

Thus the Merkley-Levin across-the-board ban on risky proprietary trading became a partial ban in which insurers, mutual funds and trusts are completely exempt, and banks can still gamble three percent of their holdings. In practice, it will be up to future regulators to define how that limit will be calculated – and one can only imagine how far banks like Goldman Sachs will manage to stretch the loopholes in what's left of the Volcker rule. "It's not a total nothing burger," sighs one aide. "But, by the end, it didn't change a whole lot."

If the Volcker rule was a regulatory Godzilla threatening to stomp out Wall Street's self-serving investments, the proposal to shut down derivatives was nothing short of a planet-smashing asteroid headed straight at the heart of the financial industry's most reckless abuses. The key battle involved the so-called "Lincoln rule," put forward by Sen. Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas, which would have forced big banks to spin off their derivatives desks in the same way the Volcker rule would have forced them to give up proprietary trading. Banks would have to make a choice: Either forgo access to the cheap cash of the Federal Reserve, or give up gambling with dangerous instruments like credit-default swaps. Banks, in short, would have to go back to making money the old-fashioned way – making smart loans, underwriting new businesses, earning simple fees on customer trades. No more leveraged gambling on whacked-out acid-trip derivatives deals, no more walking around with torches and taking out fire insurance on other people's houses, no more running up huge markers on the taxpayer's dime.

This, obviously, could not be permitted. Thanks to Clinton-era deregulation, the market for derivatives is now 100 times larger than the federal budget, and five of the country's biggest banks control more than 90 percent of the business. So the leadership of both parties pulled out all the stops to ensure that the Lincoln rule would be Swiss-cheesed to death before it ever saw the light of day.

The effort began with an extraordinary scene on the floor of the Senate – one that testifies to the nearly unanimous respect that senators hold for the human loophole machine known as Chris Dodd. In late May, the week the Senate voted on its version of the bill, Dodd came up with a hastily composed, five-page substitute to the Lincoln rule that would create a "financial stability" council with the power to unilaterally kill the rule. Faced with opposition from members of his own party, Dodd agreed to withdraw his substitute two days before the Senate vote – but given his track record of legislative maneuvering on behalf of big banks, his fellow Democrats weren't about to take him at his word. A group of senators from Dodd's own party – including Maria Cantwell of Washington – arranged to stay on the Senate floor in shifts, ensuring that there would be someone there to object in case Dodd tried to push his substitute through ­during one of those quiet, empty-hall, C-SPAN moments when no one was looking.

The fact that a group of Democrats had to come up with a scheme to prevent one of their own leaders from dropping a ­roofie in their legislative drinks pretty much sums up the state of affairs in Congress. "Yeah, that's the way it went down," says a Senate aide familiar with the Dodd Watch maneuver.

With Dodd unable to introduce his plan to gut the Lincoln rule, the measure actually passed in the Senate, to the extreme surprise of almost everyone on the Hill. This was a rare example of the Senate leadership not just allowing a vote on a financial reform guaranteed to cost major campaign contributors billions of dollars, but actually passing it.

But the ink was barely dry on the Senate bill before a full-blown mobilization against the Lincoln rule was under way. Just days after the Senate vote, Barney Frank came out and voiced opposition to the rule, saying it "goes too far." He trotted out Wall Street's lame, catchall justification for unfettered speculation: Banks need derivatives to balance their portfolios and "hedge their own risk." Not long after, a group of 43 conservative House Democrats calling themselves the "New ­Democrat Coalition" refused to support the reform bill unless the toughest part of the Lincoln rule – section 716 – was gutted. "They were threatening to vote against the legislation unless accommodations were made for the banks, and the biggest accommodation was watering down 716," says Michael Greenberger, a Clinton-era ­financial regulator involved in the talks.

It seemed like every Democrat who mattered was against 716: Dodd, Frank, the New Democrats, the Treasury department, the influential FDIC chief Sheila Bair, even Paul Volcker. Schumer and other New Yorkers lobbied mightily against it, arguing that it would be a drain on the income of Wall Street banks; New York mayor ­Michael Bloomberg traveled to Washington specifically to lobby against the Lincoln rule. But the crowd had turned against Wall Street, and the populist scrubs seemed like they were about to win big.

But then Blanche Lincoln, the captain of the scrubs, coughed up the ball. Lincoln, who was never considered a particularly strong advocate of finance reform, had originally proposed her ban on derivatives – the most radical reform in the entire bill – during a re-election campaign in which she faced a stiff populist challenge from Bill Halter, the lieutenant governor of Arkansas. Rumors circulated in Washington that Democratic leaders were cynically holding off on gutting Lincoln's proposal until she got past Halter in the primary.

If that was the plan, it worked. In early June, only a week after she defeated Halter in the runoff, Lincoln set about gutting her own rule. First she offered a broad exemption for community banks. Then a group of conservative House Democrats led by Rep. Collin Peterson of ­Minnesota ­proposed an even bigger compromise – one that would exempt virtually every type of derivative from federal oversight. "I was told that Peterson offered this compromise and Lincoln quickly accepted it," says Greenberger.

That was the beginning of the end. The new deal allowed banks to keep their derivatives desks by moving them into subsidiary units and exempted whole classes of derivatives from regulation: interest-rate swaps (the culprits in disasters like Greece and Orange County), foreign-exchange swaps (which helped trigger a global crash after Long Term Capital Management imploded in 1998), cleared credit-default swaps (a big contributor to the AIG collapse) and currency swaps (also involved in the Greece mess). "About 90 percent of the derivatives market was exempted," says Greenberger.

In the end, this would be the ­entire list of derivatives that are subject to the new law: credit-­default swaps that have not been cleared by regulators and swaps involving commodities other than silver and gold.

Hilariously, even the few new regulations on derivatives that remained in the bill don't seem to worry Wall Street. Just a few weeks after Lincoln agreed to gut the measure, famed JP Morgan executive Blythe Masters, often credited as one of the inventors of the credit-default swap – one insider calls her "the Darth Vader of the swaps market" – actually sounded psyched about the bill. The new law, she declared publicly, won't even hurt energy commodities, one of the few classes of derivatives that Lincoln didn't exempt.

"It's not a big change for commodities," Masters said. "It's fine-tuning more than a material impact." The so-called reforms, she concluded, "are actually going to be very beneficial for the industry."

And that, ladies and gentlemen, is what the Obama administration is touting as the toughest financial reform since the Great Depression.

The systematic gutting of both the Lincoln rule and the Volcker rule in the final days before the passage of Dodd-Frank was especially painful, in part, because so many other crucial reforms that would have spoken directly to the Big Fraud had already been whitewashed out of the bill. An amendment mandating the breakup of too-big-to-fail companies got walloped back in May, and Congress even rejected a ban on "naked" credit-default swaps – the ­financial equivalent of ­selling somebody a car with crappy brakes and then taking out a life-insurance policy on the driver.

The few reforms that Congress didn't ­reject outright it simply kicked into a ­series of "study groups" created by the bill. Along with promised studies on no-­brainers like executive compensation and credit-rating agencies, the bill even punts on the fundamental question of how much capital banks should be required to keep on hand as a hedge against meltdowns, leaving the question to the Basel banking conferences in Switzerland later this year, where financial interests from all over the world will gather to hammer things out in inscrutable backroom negotiations.

"The next phase of all this – the regulatory phase – is going to be supertechnical and complex," says one Senate aide. "It raises questions about how journalists are going to keep the public the slightest bit interested. You might as well just hit the snooze button."

Worst of all, some analysts warn that the failure to rein in Wall Street makes another meltdown a near-certainty. "Oh, sure, within a decade," said Johnson, the MIT economist. "The question: Is it three years or seven years?"

Johnson was part of a panel sponsored by the nonpartisan Roosevelt Institute – including Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and bailout watchdog Elizabeth Warren – that concluded back in March that the reform bill wouldn't do anything to stop a "doomsday cycle." Too-big-to-fail banks, they said, would continue to borrow money to take massive risks, pay shareholders and management bonuses with the proceeds, then stick taxpayers with the bill when it all goes wrong. "Risk-taking at banks will soon be larger than ever," the panel warned.

Without the Volcker rule and the ­Lincoln rule, the final version of finance reform is like treating the opportunistic symptoms of AIDS without taking on the virus itself. In a sense, the failure of Congress to treat the disease is a tacit admission that it has no strategy for our economy going forward that doesn't involve continually inflating and reinflating speculative bubbles. Which sucks, because what happened to our economy over the past three years, and is still happening to it now, was not an accident or an oversight, but a sweeping crime wave unleashed by a financial industry gone completely over to the dark side. The bill Congress just passed doesn't go after the criminals where they live, or even make what they're doing a crime; all it does is put a baseball bat under the bed and add an extra lock or two on the doors. It's a hack job, a C-minus effort. See you at the next financial crisis.

This article originally appeared in RS 1111, on newsstands August 6, 2010.